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Introduction
Michael Swack and NoÉmi Giszpenc

C

all it “action-discussion.” No, it’s not an oxymoron.
Community Development Financial
It’s the type of work done by the Financial InnovaInnovations Weather the Current Crisis
tions Roundtable, a “think-do tank” housed at the
It would be difficult at this time (Fall of 2008) to ignore the fact
Carsey Institute at the University of New Hampshire.
that the term “financial innovation” has come into great disfavor
The Financial Innovations Roundtable brings together
following the collapse of financial markets, in large part due to
nearly 100 leaders from conventional financial institutions
certain kinds of “innovations”, or the lack of understanding or
such as banks, mortgage companies, insurance companies,
abuse of those innovations. Yet it would be a mistake to think
that all innovation has been bad. Throughout this difficult peand investment firms as well as leaders from public agenriod, we have been contacting various CDFIs and asking about
cies, community development financial institutions (CDthe performance of their portfolios. The funds we have talked to,
FIs), foundations, pension funds, religious institutions, and
including those featured in this publication (e.g., the New Hampuniversities. These participants collaborate on increasing the
shire Community Loan Fund, Self-Help in North Carolina, and
the
Community Reinvestment Fund in Minneapolis, among othflow of capital and access to financial services in low-income
ers) are reporting that their portfolios are performing well. Selfcommunities.
Help, for example, which has a large portfolio of single-family
The group convenes annually to address broad policy ishomes, reports that their defaults are up only about 0.5%. They
have ample reserves and capital and are doing well. Even if the
sues in the practice of community economic development.
economy performs poorly over the next couple of years, and their
Members identify the challenges inherent in community dedefaults increase due to macroeconomic factors (such as higher
velopment and create cross-sector partnerships to develop
unemployment among borrowers), they are well positioned to
practical solutions. Over the course of the year, these partnerweather the storm. In stark contrast to many subprime lenders,
CDFIs relied on meticulous underwriting, carefully qualifying
ships engage in various initiatives and research, working to
people based on real incomes, homeowner training, required
remove the barriers between conventional and nontraditional
down payments, understanding local markets and more. In New
lenders, investors, and markets, and to create products and
Hampshire, defaults in the Manufactured Housing Coops (see
services that offer low-income communities greater access to
article, p. 22) are very low, and the coops themselves are current in their payments to the Loan Fund. It is important to note
capital and financial services. This publication presents sevthat large players in the financial markets such as Fannie Mae
eral innovations that roundtable participants have created or
and the ratings agency of Standard and Poor’s, both described in
are currently developing.
various articles in this publication, approached the community
development sector very carefully, performed due diligence and,
The first section looks at capital markets and community
in fact, contributed to the successful initiatives described in this
development. “Capital Markets for Community Development
publication.
Lenders: Questions and Answers,” on page 7, gives an overview of the problems faced by CDFIs in accessing traditional
agreed to buy the loans and package them into mortgagecapital markets. CDFIs generally lack sufficient liquidity
backed securities. Fannie Mae can do this because Self-Help
because once they loan their
obtained a grant from the
money, they typically cannot
Ford Foundation that allows
Over the course of the year, these partnerships
lend to any new projects before
it to guarantee the loans,
engage in various initiatives and research, workbeing repaid, which is called
covering most of the risk of
ing to remove the barriers between conventional
keeping loans “in portfolio.”
default.
and nontraditional lenders, investors, and marThe alternative is to sell them
Investing in community
kets, and to create products and services that offer
to the secondary market or to
development can be made
low-income communities greater access to capital
borrow on the basis of assets.
more attractive by reducing
and financial services.
Some CDFIs do sell to the
risk, as Self-Help has done,
secondary market. One exor by reducing the percepample is the mortgage program run by Self-Help Ventures
tion of risk, which can be done by increasing the availability
of North Carolina, described on page 16. A major feature of
of information. To attract a greater number and wider class
the program is its partnership with Fannie Mae, which has
of investors for mortgage-backed securities and other asset-
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backed securities from community development lenders, the
Financial Innovations Roundtable has obtained a public rating for an asset-backed security (see “Creating the First Rated
Pool of Securities Backed by Community Development Assets,” p. 11). The Community Reinvestment Fund issued a rated asset-backed security in 2004, which allowed stakeholders
(foundations, for example) to buy more than they could when
the assets were unrated and new players (insurance companies, mutual funds, banks) to buy for the first time. Replicating this model can make unlimited funds available to community development lenders.
Providing insurance for transactions both reduces risk and
provides information, attracting more investors. “The Community Development Assurance Company” on page 18 describes how Financial Innovations Roundtable members have
designed a company that can sell insurance to CDFIs on their
transactions (such as selling their loans to the secondary markets). Having an insurance policy on the transaction reduces
risk and therefore increases demand and improves terms
for the transactions. The insurance company itself would be
publicly rated, giving investors a clear picture of its financial
strength and activities.
Lack of volume prevents many CDFIs from taking advantage of another source of funds, commercial paper. Many
companies use these short-term loans, which are typically
rolled over at maturity. Borrowing against their assets instead
of selling their loans would be another way for CDFIs to obtain liquidity. Financial Innovations Roundtable members
have designed a Commercial Paper Co-op that would aggregate the short-term borrowing needs of its CDFI members
and present their assets in a framework understandable by
ratings agencies (see “The Commercial Paper Co-op,” p. 22).
A second section of this report tackles the issue of Missionrelated Investing and Targeted Investing. Most foundations
place their endowment in traditional investments that will
preserve the principal and generate ongoing dividends. Many
worthwhile community development projects also generate
returns, albeit not all at market rates. Some foundations and
public pension funds have diversified their investment portfolio to include more mission-related projects. This section
of the report examines the mission-related investing projects
of the F.B. Heron Foundation and the targeted investments
of CalPERS, the California Public Employees Retirement System (see pp. 27 and 32, respectively).
The Heron Foundation has developed a tool called the
“Mission-related Investment Continuum” that allows it to
examine investment opportunities in different asset classes
within a framework of a set asset-allocation policy. Its staff

can find, investigate, and promote investment opportunities for review by investment managers. The foundation is
eager to share its lessons with other foundations and institutional investors.
To overcome the challenge of being unable to make belowmarket investments, CalPERS has chosen to put some funds
into investments that meet certain geographic and diversity
criteria while maintaining the high standards for return required of all investments. These investments have proved
quite successful both as revenue generators (their primary
purpose) and as sources of benefit to the community.
A third section of the report examines a work in progress,
Resident Owned Communities USA. Building on the success
of the New Hampshire Community Loan Fund’s (NHCLF)
Manufactured Housing Initiative, which has enabled the residents of 80 mobile home parks to purchase the land on which
they live and run the parks themselves as cooperatives, ROC
USA plans to take resident-ownership to scale by training
practitioners, sourcing senior debt, and leveraging subordinate debt through credit enhancements (see “Manufactured
Home Communities – ROC USA, p. 38). Participants of the
Financial Innovations Roundtable are helping NHCLF analyze the process and launch ROC USA nationally.
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Capital Markets for Community Development
Lenders: Questions and Answers
Michael Swack, Carsey Institute, University of New Hampshire

C

ommunity development financial institutions (CDFIs) have grown significantly in size and scope in the
past quarter century. After decades of lending where
others were often reluctant to lend, many CDFIs have demonstrated a solid capability to manage risk in their markets and
have developed strong portfolios. As they continue to expand
to meet the ever-increasing housing, business, and facility demands of their communities, their funding needs are growing.
At the same time, the traditional sources of community development capital, such as government and foundation funding,
are diminishing, and many community development lenders
are looking for new strategies and techniques to raise money. Some have turned their attention to conventional capital
markets. Can this be done? If so, how? Is it a good idea? This
article addresses a few of these questions.

What are community development financial
institutions?
CDFIs are financial institutions that are committed to meeting
the credit needs of low-income individuals and communities.
Typically, CDFIs are either community-based nonprofit organizations or national intermediaries with local community
offices. They are sensitive to the community’s financial needs,
understand the local market, and are willing to invest the
time and resources needed to find and cultivate sound lending opportunities in these neighborhoods. As such, they are
able to develop loan and investment products that differ from
conventional lenders’ offerings, providing funding where traditional lenders may not.
Community development loan funds, community development credit unions, community development corporation loan funds, microenterprise funds, and community development banks are all considered CDFIs. All of these are
private, nonprofit corporations, with the exception of community development banks, which are private, for-profit
entities that have a community development purpose.1
Most CDFIs have been created since 1980, and most remain small by conventional standards. However, the CDFI
industry has begun to scale up. The CDFI Data Project, a
foundation-funded initiative, collects industry-wide data on
CDFIs.2 As of the end of 2006, about 1,000 CDFIs were operating in the United States. The Data Project collected data

from 505 CDFIs in 2006. Collectively the 505 controlled $15.1
billion in outstanding financing and financed around 70,000
units of affordable housing in 2006. The CDFIs’ net loan losses in 2006 were less than one-half of one percent of their out-

CDFIs are able to develop loan and investment
products that differ from conventional lenders’
offerings, providing funding where traditional lenders may not.
standing loans (matching the rate of conventional financial
institutions), and they had sufficient reserves and equity bases
to cover those losses.

Where do CDFIs get their funds, and how do they
operate?
CDFIs are generally financed through a mix of public and private funds that include loans, grants, and investments. Their
growth has accelerated since 1995 owing in large part to the
creation of the CDFI Fund, a program within the U.S. Department of Treasury. The CDFI Fund was established in 1994 to
support CDFIs and to make capital available to CDFIs serving
underserved communities and individuals. The CDFI Fund
is the largest source of funding for CDFIs, providing since its
inception more than $860 million in awards to community
development financial institutions (see www.cdfifund.gov).
CDFIs lend this money to the communities in which they
work and typically oversee every aspect of the loan. Most CDFIs review applications, originate loans, book the loans, service them, and hold them in their portfolios until the loans
are completely repaid. This type of top to bottom (vertically
integrated) lending is known as portfolio lending.

How is this type of lending different from what
conventional banks do?
In the 1970s and 1980s, banks began packaging and selling
their residential mortgage loans to a secondary market in a
process known as securitization. Banks no longer had to fund
each loan through their deposits. Instead, they could sell their
loans to investors and use the revenue to fund more loans.
The birth of securitization allowed banks to originate more
loans, generate more revenue on the fees from the origina-
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What’s the deal with the subprime mortgage
crisis?
Subprime mortgages were the source of the recent financial crisis. Does that mean securitization is a bad idea? What is the difference between subprime mortgages and CDFI lending?
Much of the blame for the subprime lending crisis lies with
mortgage originators (lenders). It was the lenders (often mortgage brokers who may or may not have worked for a particular
bank) who ultimately lent funds to people with poor credit and a
high risk of default. Many of these originators used unscrupulous
methods to encourage people to borrow money they could not
afford to repay, particularly when the original interest rate on an
adjustable rate mortgage reset to a higher rate after a few years.
Often the originator did not care whether a borrower could repay
the loan because the broker would earn a fee on the origination
regardless and would have no responsibility for the repayment of
the loan. The loans would then be sold and bundled into securities. Bundles of these high-risk loans were sold to investors as
highly rated investments even though the underlying mortgages
were very risky.
CDFIs underwrite their loans to a much higher standard. They
carefully assess what each borrower can afford and establish rates
and terms that match the borrowers’ needs. Loans underwritten
by CDFIs have served lower-income people well and have experienced much lower losses during this period.

tions, and sell off their risk of holding fixed-rate loans in their
portfolios.3 The process of originating loans and selling them,
called capital markets lending, is now the standard for banks.
Today, securitization accounts for trillions of dollars of transactions and involves mortgage finance companies and other
specialty finance companies as well as banks.4

What exactly are capital markets?
Capital markets are markets where individuals, governments,
and businesses trade money. Those with excess funds transfer
capital to those who need it. In return, the investors expect
a rate of return on their money that is consistent with the
amount of risk they are taking. Capital markets allow large
amounts of money to be pooled, while giving individual investors an opportunity to diversify their risk. The stock and
bond markets are two of the major capital markets.

What is the difference between primary and
secondary capital markets?
The primary market is where new securities are issued. A corporation or government agency that needs funds issues these
rights of ownership, interest, or dividends to willing buyers,
most often in the form of stock or bonds. The securities are
usually underwritten by investment banks, which guarantee

a minimum price to the seller for the security. These banks
then sell the securities to the public in the secondary capital
market. Secondary markets are where securities are traded.
The vast majority of financial transactions that occur through
stock exchanges, bond markets, futures markets, or other
mechanisms all happen in the secondary market.

Can you give an example of how this works?
Consider the residential mortgage system in the United
States. This system is made up of a primary market and a
secondary market. In the primary mortgage market, banks
provide funds directly to the new homeowner, who in turn
issues a security, the mortgage, to the bank. The secondary market is where this mortgage loan is bought and sold
by investors. The bank that made the loan in the primary
market wants to sell the mortgage and use the money to
originate more loans. Because the mortgage is backed by
the homeowner’s real estate, it is an attractive security for
investors. In most cases, one of the two largest secondary mortgage market institutions—the Federal National
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) or the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac)—will buy the
mortgage from the bank. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac aggregate single- and multifamily housing loans into pools,
and with the pools of mortgages and ultimately the real
estate serving as collateral, they create mortgage-backed
securities. (An asset-backed security is a security backed by
assets that can include real estate and other assets.) To finance their future purchases, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
sell these mortgage-backed securities to public investors
at a fixed rate of return, maintaining the credit risk of these
loans on their own books.

So, investors around the country are trading my
mortgage with my local bank?
Yes. The idea behind this secondary market is that while home
loans are local loans, the system of finance for them need not
be. National capital markets provide funds for local housing
markets. With the proceeds from the sale of their mortgages,
primary lenders replenish their money supply and use it to
make more loans. Without this secondary market, primary
lenders would be forced to keep all their loans in their portfolios. They could make loans only from the money they had
in deposits, restricting their ability to serve the needs of new
homeowners.
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Aren’t CDCs and CDFIs already involved in these
primary and secondary capital markets?
Yes, in a limited way they are. CDFIs are primary market
lenders. They receive money from foundations and government agencies and lend it to individuals and communities
that need funds.

That seems to work in my community, so what’s
the problem?
The problem is that foundations and government have limited funds to meet the demand for capital in your community.
People want to buy homes and start businesses. Organizations want to develop housing and community facilities. CDFIs are mostly portfolio lenders. Although they have become
good at assessing risk and managing healthy portfolios, they
are limited by the amount of money they receive in grants and
donations. They cannot meet all their lending needs. Many
CDFIs could expand their lending and better serve their communities if they complemented their portfolio lending with
some capital markets lending. After all, there is a lot of money
out there in the capital markets—and communities could use
it. A CDFI involved in capital markets lending would employ methods, such as securitization, that would distribute its
loans among a range of investors, instead of holding all of the
loans in its portfolio. By selling their loans on the secondary
market, CDFIs can increase their liquidity.

Many CDFIs could expand their lending and better
serve their communities if they complemented their
portfolio lending with some capital markets lending By selling their loans on the secondary market,
CDFIs can increase their liquidity.
We want Wall Street to buy our loans. What’s the
hitch? Do we have to discount our loans?
Not necessarily. Investors will want to pay less than the face
value of a loan if they think the loan will not perform. But
CDFI loans perform and yield good returns. CDFIs simply
have to demonstrate this success in a way that investors will
understand.

How can CDFIs demonstrate success?
First, the CDFI industry needs to change some collective
behaviors in order to access these markets. In general, here’s
what the capital markets are looking for:

Performance Data
Capital markets like a lot of information and data.
Investors want to know how CDFIs perform over
time. What are the rates of delinquency, default, and
recovery? Currently, most CDFIs have weaker standards
of data collection and measurement than these markets
want, and they often have different definitions of what
constitutes a delinquency or default. To show the strength
of their loans, CDFIs must illustrate performance using
standard industry data and definitions.
Standardization
This is a big one. Capital markets like vanilla. Not
caramel, not strawberry, not chocolate. Investors want
CDFIs to standardize things within the industry so they
can better understand the products and appropriately
assess risk. The capital markets want not only standard
data collection but standardized performance tracking
tools; uniform ways of servicing, underwriting,
and assessing risk; and a set method of collection.
The CDFI industry does not currently have any
specific standards for these practices. However, trade
associations of CDFIs are becoming larger and more
sophisticated and have begun to promote operating
practices among their members that enhance the
industry’s ability to meet the capital markets’ standards.
For example, the Opportunity Finance Network has
developed a CDFI Assessment and Rating System
(CARS™) that analyzes and rates CDFIs on their impact
(effective use of their financial resources to achieve their
stated mission) and financial strength and performance
(overall credit-worthiness based on past financial
performance, current financial strength, and apparent
risk factors). It is the first step toward standardizing
CDFI processes and procedures.
Volume
Capital markets like to deal with big numbers. They want
pools of loans that are $50 million or more in value. By
comparison, CDFIs deal in very small numbers. Some
CDFIs are developing mechanisms for pooling their
loans to offer investors the big numbers they desire.
Pricing
The capital markets need products that are priced
properly relative to risk and offer an attractive return.
Not all CDFI products can meet the pricing criteria,
but many can and do. CDFIs must identify and market
these products.
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Credit Enhancements
	To make CDFI products more attractive, investors
may want certain credit enhancements. Credit
enhancements, such as insurance or letters of credit (an
irrevocable commitment by a bank to pay), make loans
less risky to investors by guaranteeing regular payments.
CDFIs could leverage some of their government and
foundation money as credit enhancements in, perhaps,
a better use of these funds. (See p. 18 on the Community
Development Assurance company, which will provide
insurance for CDFI transactions.)

What are the barriers to entering capital markets?
The first barrier is volume. To achieve larger volume, CDFIs
can and have created cooperatives in which CDFIs pool their
loans and sell them to an institutional investor similar to Fannie Mae. By enticing an investor with large volume and low
risk resulting from the geographic dispersion of the loans,
pooling can be a cost-effective way for smaller CDFIs to increase their liquidity.5
The second barrier is credit enhancements. A common tool
used to promote the sale of loans is financial guarantee insurance. This insurance ensures that payments are made to investors who buy pools of loans. CDFIs could negotiate a financial guarantee through an established insurance company and
provide a credit enhancement on a pool of community development loans. The enhancement would help the pool achieve
a good rating from one of the rating agencies, which would
signal that the pool was a sound investment.6 The favorably
rated security could then more easily be sold in the financial
markets, where many insurance companies and mutual funds
buy only highly rated securities.

Won’t banks and lenders lose the close working
relationships they have cultivated with borrowers
when they sell the loans?
Not at all. In most instances, lenders will continue to directly
service their own loans. They will need to maintain a close
relationship with borrowers, providing them technical assistance and monitoring their performance to ensure a healthy
return to investors.

Will CDFIs have to adjust their portfolio to meet
the specific “appetite” of the market, as opposed to
the needs of the borrowers and communities they
currently serve?
Not necessarily. Many CDFIs will continue to do portfolio
lending even if they are able to sell some of their loans. That

is, they will still have loans that meet certain unique needs or
circumstances and require the CDFI to service and hold the
loan to maturity. In fact, a CDFI might have many of these.
But, many community development lenders have developed
certain prepackaged loan products, such as housing or facility
loans. These loans are underwritten in a consistent way and
are “standard” within the CDFI’s own portfolio. These are the
types of loans that would best be packaged and sold to investors in the capital markets.

Will institutional investors really buy CDFI loans?
Has anyone actually done anything yet?
Yes, it can work, and it has. For example, both the Community
Reinvestment Fund (CRF) of Minneapolis, Minnesota, and
Self-Help of Durham, North Carolina, have successfully accessed capital markets and are providing increased liquidity to
the community development field (see pp. 11 and 16, respectively). To attract institutional investors, CRF began pooling
and underwriting loans that had been originated by a range
of smaller community development lenders around the country. They have amassed more than $700 million worth of loans
and sold them to the secondary markets, bringing in capital
for these small lenders. Self-Help developed and marketed a
standard home mortgage product to attract investors and has
underwritten more than $4.5 billion in these mortgages for
low-income communities. Both organizations’ efforts have attracted a number of institutional investors to these community development projects, including Prudential Securities,
MetLife, and Equitable Insurance.

Where can I find additional information?
This publication details a number of current and future innovations to help CDFIs access capital markets developed by the
Financial Innovations Roundtable. To learn more, visit http://
www.carseyinstitute.unh.edu/fir.html.
1
See http://www.ncif.org/index.php/CDBIindustry/CDBIs/ for more on
Community Development Banking Institutions.
2
See http://www.opportunityfinance.net/industry/industry_sub2.
aspx?id=236 for more on the CDFI Data Project and to access publications
based on its research.
3
Securitization protects banks from interest rate volatility, reducing risk.
Before securitization, banks would make a loan at 6% for 30 years. Several
years later, they might suffer a loss, paying their depositors more than 6% if
interest rates went up.
4
Kirsten Moy and Alan Okagaki, “Changing Capital Markets and Their Implications for Community Development Finance” (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2001), available at http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2001/
07metropolitanpolicy_moy.aspx.
5
See Gregory Stanton, “Unblocking Obstacles to Capital Markets for Community Development Lenders” (Manchester, NH: Community Economic
Development Press, School of Community Economic Development, Southern New Hampshire University, 2003). For reprints contact arc@snhu.edu
or for an electronic copy see http://www.community-wealth.org/_pdfs/articles-publications/cdfis/article-stanton.pdf.
6
Ibid.
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Creating the First Rated Pool of Securities Backed by
Community Development Assets
Michael Swack, Carsey Institute, University of New Hampshire

S

ince 1994 when Congress directed the Department of
Treasury to create the Community Development Financial Institutions Fund, Community Development
Financial Institutions (CDFIs) have become more prominent
players in community development lending. CDFIs are committed to meeting the credit needs of low-income individuals
and communities. They are sensitive to local needs and they
are able to develop loan and investment products that differ
from conventional loan products. CDFIs are also sophisticated in their approach to meeting credit needs and providing
assistance to borrowers, both organizational and individual.
There are different types of CDFIs, but they all share a
commitment to providing credit and technical assistance
to unconventional borrowers (that is, low-income individuals and community-based development organizations)
and filling capital gaps that conventional lenders do not or
cannot fill (see box).
The success of CDFIs may stem from special expertise in
management and underwriting (analyzing the credit-worthiness of borrowers, that is, their ability to repay a given
loan, and the suitability of the loan’s purpose), the greater
time CDFIs spend on project management, and the smaller
number of projects they handle relative to conventional
lenders.2

Information Asymmetry
Conventional lenders may hesitate to enter the market
for low-income individuals and communities because the
lenders lack sufficient information or expertise to exploit
the opportunities to earn a profit. In other words, they are
suffering from “information asymmetry”: they know less
than other players in the marketplace, such as potential borrowers, about their likelihood of repayment.3 Unlike conventional lenders, CDFIs know much more about low-income
individuals and communities, which allows them to operate
more successfully.
Conventional capital markets often lack information on
CDFIs also. CDFIs are generally small institutions that often
customize their products for their borrowers. Counter to the
trend in conventional finance, CDFIs are more often vertical-

The Special Role of CDFI Lending
The following are types of activities, including lending,
that
CDFIs offer in low-income communities:1

1. Predevelopment financing in the early stages of a project,
which allows the project to reach the stage where it is bankable;
2. Junior financing (subordinate debt that has a right to the borrower’s assets only after senior debts have been paid), which
cushions conventional loans above certain loan-to-value ratios
(for example, loans over 75% loan-to-value ratio);
3. Seasoning loans (holding them for a certain length of time) to
demonstrate their safety so conventional institutions can later
purchase or refinance them;
4. Demonstrating the effectiveness of new lending approaches,
underwriting methods and loan products so that conventional
institutions can become comfortable with the new approaches
and products;
5.	High transaction cost loans: loans that are too small or complicated and thus cost too much because of the time involved;
6.	Loans that allow community development organizations or
entrepreneurs to gain experience and a track record so they
can use conventional lenders in the future; and,
7.	High-risk loans in general, for reasons such as lack of organizational financial strength, lack of take-out financing, difficult
neighborhood, scattered sites, or a nontraditional income
stream.

ly integrated, carrying out most functions internally (for example, loan origination, servicing, and technical assistance).
Such a structure helps CDFIs maintain close contact with
their customers, but this operating model also creates higher

Customized loans with differing underwriting
standards and insufficient information about the
field make it difficult for the community development field to engage in securitization.
“transaction costs” (costs involved in the process of making
and monitoring a loan) and less efficiency.4 Moreover, CDFI
underwriting standards and loan documents are frequently
nonstandardized.
The lack of standardized performance data in community
development lending perpetuates the perception that com-
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munity development loans are risky.5 For any emerging asset
class, such as community development loans, to gain credibility in the capital markets, it must have five years of reliable
performance data.6 This allows investors to assess risk over
time. The CDFI field has no large body of data that is uniformly collected and highly reliable.
Customized loans with differing underwriting standards
and insufficient information about the field make it difficult
for the community development field to engage in securitization, the process of packaging a pool of similar financial instruments into a new instrument that can be sold to investors
(see previous article, p. 7).

The Community Reinvestment Fund: A Rated
Securitization Model7
The Financial Innovations Roundtable has increased knowledge about community development lending by catalyzing a
public rating for an asset-backed security transaction of pooled
community development loans. The roundtable brought together a loan aggregator (the Community Reinvestment Fund
of Minneapolis), a Wall Street ratings agency (Standard and
Poor’s), capital markets specialists (Wall Street Without Walls
volunteer financial experts), private foundations (Fannie Mae
and Heron Foundations) and other financial professionals to
accomplish this goal. The first transaction, described below,
closed in November 2004.
Community Reinvestment Fund (CRF) is a Minneapolisbased 501(c) 3 corporation that began operations in 1988
and provides new loan capital for community-based development organizations by creating a secondary market for
community development loans. These development loans
are distinguished from traditional commercial loans in that,
in addition to financial objectives, they emphasize social
objectives such as job creation, affordable housing, and
community revitalization in economically distressed communities or among economically or socially disadvantaged
groups.
CRF purchases loans, sells loans it has purchased to special purpose entities (SPEs), facilitates the issuance of asset-backed securities supported by the loans owned by the
SPEs, services the loans it has sold to the SPEs, and manages
New Markets Tax Credits entities on behalf of investors.
Prior to 2004, CRF successfully issued 16 series of its
Community Reinvestment Fund Revenue Bond and Note
Program with a total par (face or nominal) volume of more
than $300 million. In addition, CRF released a $74.6 million
affordable housing note issue in 2001. CRF never submitted

any of these transactions for a public or private rating.
CRF conducts extensive credit reviews and analyses on
the loan originators and each loan. Their diligence is reflected in the performance of these loan pools, which has
exceeded general expectations. To date CRF loan portfolios
have experienced a cumulative loan default rate of 0.57%.
Combining its mission and this financing experience,
CRF has a proven ability to analyze loan originators and
project accurate loss expectations. Socially responsible
institutional investors have expressed their confidence in
CRF’s capabilities by purchasing CRF’s asset-backed securitizations. In fact, many of CRF’s institutional investors hit
their limit on the maximum exposure to nonrated community development loan-backed securities held in their
respective portfolios.

A New Approach and the First Rated Community
Development Securitization
During a Financial Innovations Roundtable meeting in
early 2002, a consensus of attendees suggested that the
best way to demonstrate the marketability and underlying
credit quality of selected community development loans
was to assist an existing aggregator in underwriting the
first rated asset-backed securitization supported by a pool
of community development loans. To increase the marketability of this security, the original plans also called for
purchasing financial guaranty insurance on the issue as a
credit enhancement (for reasons described below, this did
not take place).
The structure of this rated issue would serve as a template or model for future transactions. A rated security
would also attract new investor classes, thereby creating an
unlimited flow of new capital into the community development sector. Likewise, current socially responsible investors
in this asset type would no longer be constrained by internal or external caps imposed on unrated securities.
To expedite the selection of a potential issuer, roundtable participants chose to identify an existing loan aggregator with the operating experience and the support of an
existing team of financial intermediaries, including bond
attorneys, investment bankers, quantitative financial analysts, and others. CRF met these qualifications and agreed
to work with Wall Street Without Walls.

“CRF-17” Transaction Overview
The CRF issued the CRF USA Community Reinvestment Revenue Notes, Series 17 as part of its ongoing mission to create a
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Tr a n s a c t i o n T e rm S h e e t
Table 1: CRF-17 Description
Issuer

CRF-17 LLC

Servicer

CRF, Inc

Loan Originators
		
		
		

Various community development corporations,
community development financial institutions,
governmental, non-profit and other community
development lenders.

Trustee

Wells Fargo Bank, NA

Back-Up Servicer

Wells Fargo Bank, NA

Rating Agency

Standard & Poor’s

Foundation Support

Table 2: Ratings and Yields on Notes
Class

Par

Rating

Yield

$8,871,000

AAA

2.79%

Class A-2

8,610,000

AAA

3.62

Class A-3

8,610,000

AAA

4.25

Class A-1

Class B

7,674,000

A

5.79

Class C

6,523,000

BB

8.60

Class D

3,000,000

NR

6.59

Class E

2,814,000

NR

6.33

		

$46,102,000		

6.54%

Table 3: Loan Pool
Number of Loans

123

Number of States

19

Largest Geographic
Concentrations

25.7% Northern California

		

15.3% Southern California

		

13.1% Minnesota

Largest SIC Codes

secondary market for selected community development and
affordable housing loans, allowing loan originators to reinvest
the proceeds of selling loans back into their respective communities. CRF sells these loans to an issuer—a bankruptcyremote, special purpose entity—that in turn issues the notes,
secured by the purchased loans.
The CRF-17 issue was priced in October 2004. The accompanying term sheet provides an overview of the transaction.

7.9% Gasoline Service Stations

		

7.8% Apartment Building Owners

		

7.5% Hotels and Motels

Avg. Loan Balance

$373,058

Weighted Avg. Loan Rate

7.25%

Weighted Avg. LTV

72.4%

Weighted Avg. Loan Seasoning

22.7 months

Security of Loans
		
		

First and second mortgages
on commercial real estate;
equipment liens

Issuer’s Counsel
		

Perkins Coie LLP,
Chicago, Illinois

Initial Purchaser
		

Piper Jaffray & Co.,
Minneapolis, Minnesota

The Fannie Mae Foundation was committed to improving
access to capital markets for community development loan
originators. The foundation provided financial support to the
Financial Innovations Roundtable and to Wall Street Without
Walls, including their assistance to CRF. The foundation recognized that the successful sale of the CRF transaction was
an essential first step in facilitating new flows of capital into
the community development and affordable housing sectors.
Foundation support facilitated the CRF transaction in several
important ways, including injecting the needed capital and
information.
Capital was necessary because CRF-17 was almost three
times the size of the CRF program’s largest previous transaction. Given that loan originators cannot always wait to sell
their loans at closing, CRF maintains a bank line of credit to
purchase and “warehouse” loans until closing. However, the
size of its credit facility was insufficient to satisfy the number
of loan purchases that were projected for CRF-17. CRF’s bank
was willing to increase its warehouse line if CRF could raise
additional capital. The Fannie Mae Foundation and the F.B.
Heron Foundation lent the necessary funds to CRF. CRF repaid this loan early.
Although CRF’s historical loan performance (defaults,
losses, and recoveries) was impressive for the commercial
banking industry, Standard and Poor’s considered it too
limited. Another representative source was required. FIR
selected the Small Business Administration’s Section 504
Certified Development Company Loan Program as the alternative information source because its credit underwriting criteria closely resembled those of CRF and the CRF-17
loan portfolio. FIR used foundation funds to purchase data
from the SBA loan program and performed the first “external” analysis of it. The comprehensive analysis of this $13.9
billion (and 39,139 loan) program proved to be an acceptable benchmark for Standard and Poor’s. The program provided invaluable data on loan defaults, losses, recoveries
and prepayments, which were projected into the CRF-17
cash flows.
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Standard and Poor’s
An essential part of Standard and Poor’s due diligence analysis
focused on CRF’s portfolio performance, which was substan-

During the 14-month evaluation, Standard
and Poor’s gained confidence in the CRF team
and the credit-worthiness of the loan portfolio.
tially better than the SBA program. After hundreds of hours
of discussion, examination, and reexamination of the structure and supporting financial models, and countless “stress
tests,” Standard and Poor’s recognized the credit-worthiness
of community development loans, the strength of CRF’s
management, its credit underwriting standards, and its credit
analysis capabilities. This is evidenced by the public ratings
awarded by Standard and Poor’s.
Standard and Poor’s initially in 2002 questioned the
economic feasibility of rating a relatively small transaction
(originally planned for $25 million), particularly one involving a new asset type. They believed the smaller deal size
would not support Standard and Poor’s minimum rating fee
of $75,000.
Between July 2003 and March 2004, when CRF made
its formal presentation to Standard and Poor’s, Wall Street
Without Walls advisors and the CRF team recognized and
began to address these and other issues and concerns. The
concerns ranged from transaction size, to loan accounting
systems, servicing capabilities, underwriting standards of
loans and their originators, loan documentation, diversification issues, loan performance criteria, and loan modifications.
Early discussions with Standard and Poor’s representatives enabled the CRF team to be better prepared in their
formal ratings request. The team recognized early on that
the Standard and Poor’s approach always includes a “worstcase” stress test.
Standard and Poor’s extensive review process occurred in
April and May 2004 and was followed by a week-long onsite visit to CRF in mid-summer. Standard and Poor’s was
willing to devote the time necessary to understand the community development sector and its sometimes limited financing capabilities; evaluate the performance and financial
strengths of selected CDFI loan originators; and conduct a
thorough evaluation of CRF and its capabilities. Initially,
Standard and Poor’s intended to use its statistical/actuarial
model to evaluate the CRF portfolio, but because the number of loans was small, senior managers decided to use their

“Monte Carlo” model. This model is generally used for relatively small portfolios of assets and is more time-consuming in that it requires evaluations of individual loans in the
portfolio.
During the 14-month evaluation, Standard and Poor’s
gained confidence in the CRF team and the credit-worthiness of the loan portfolio. The rating agency and CRF continually evaluated, tested, and modified the structure and
its supporting financial model. Both parties agreed on the
final structure and cash flow, and Standard and Poor’s Credit
Committee approved the ratings in August 2004. Standard
and Poor’s will monitor the transaction until its final maturity (the bonds mature between 2006 and 2013).

Financial Guaranty Insurance
A representative of the Financial Innovations Roundtable
submitted the CRF transaction to five financial guaranty insurance companies for their consideration. Insurance would
further reduce the risk for investors but would also lower
yields slightly. None of the five insurers agreed to insure the
transaction, even though no one doubted the credit-worthiness of the assets or the transaction structure. They declined
to insure instead because of the deal size, the new asset type,
capital constraints at two companies, and the departure of the
assigned analysts at two companies. All five companies insisted on a Standard and Poor’s shadow rating (a non-public rating) before performing a complete analysis. The responses of
the insurance companies indicated they would likely respond
favorably to a similar transaction in the future.

Conclusion
CRF-17 is the first publicly rated securitization of a pool of
community development loans. The structure of the transaction and its underlying credit strength has served as model
for subsequent transactions and has become a standard
model for CRF. Perhaps the most significant benefit is that
the structure and rating attracted new, first-time institutional
investors, including Northwest Mutual Life, Western Asset
Management, CRA Fund Advisors, and Glacier Bank, thereby
successfully achieving the initial goal of bringing new classes
of investors into the community development and affordable
housing sectors.

Promoting Further Innovation
The CRF securitization allowed community development
lenders to sell existing loans. The capital markets did not impose standards on the underwriting given that lenders had
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nity development organizations and adopted by mainstream
already originated these loans under existing CRF guidelines
financial institutions. But what are the appropriate roles of
before CRF approached Standard and Poor’s. Although not
CDFIs in this process? Should they serve as the research and
all loans originated by CDFIs will qualify for sale, clearly a
development arm of more conventional finumber of these loans will (and do)
For CDFIs as a group, the nanciers, as a broker between low-income
qualify. CRF was also able to price loans
according to the interest rates set by the challenge is to develop the stan- communities and mainstream financial
originator. Although highly subsidized dards and practices that allow institutions, or in other roles?
The second question that arises is how
loans originated by community develop- them to integrate with the finanment lenders were discounted, it was not cial mainstream and thus scale best to structure a relationship between
perceptions of risk that spurred discount- up, while not losing sight of their CDFIs and the mainstream. Such integration is the challenge facing CDFIs now.
ing; loans originated at near-market value mission.
Ultimately the challenge is how to grow
were subject to very little or no discountwhile maintaining a focus on the mission to support undering. This addresses the community development lenders’
served individuals and communities. Not every organization
concern about price. Finally, the CRF loan structure allows
can achieve scale. But for CDFIs as a group, the challenge is
originators to continue to service their loans, if they choose.
to develop the standards and practices that allow them to inClearly there are opportunities for collaboration between the
tegrate with the financial mainstream and thus scale up, while
community development sector and conventional capital
not losing sight of their mission, and expand their base. This
markets in ways that address the concerns of the community
will require adopting standards, size, and data required by
development lenders. Further innovation in the field will reWall Street while maintaining the flexibility, creativity, and
quire collaboration and a measured approach to integration.
commitment that created the field in the first place.
Collaboration
Collaboration is needed on a number of fronts. Community
development lenders must collaborate with one another to
develop basic standards for collecting data that capital markets need. The field must also develop a standard and efficient infrastructure to collect data, track performance, perform back-office tasks, develop collection systems, troubleshoot, and report data. Community development lenders also
should reach scale by more actively and deliberately pooling
loans. CRF functions as an aggregator of loans, but more
aggregators are needed. Regional aggregators can diversify
1
D. Leibsohn, “Meeting Capital Needs in Low-Income Communities” (San
pools of loans geographically and by asset class, work with
Francisco: Low Income Housing Fund, 1995), pp. 3-4.
2
ratings agencies, and help service the loans of those lenders
D. DiPasquale and J. L. Cummings, “Accessing Capital Markets for Affordable Rental Housing.” In From the Neighborhoods to the Capital Markets,
who need it.
(Washington, DC: National Task Force on Affordable Housing, 1992), p. A-27.
In addition, collaboration is needed with foundations, gov3
C. Beshouri and S. Glennon, “CRA as Market Development or Tax: An
Analysis of Lending Decisions and Economic Development” (Washington,
ernment agencies and conventional capital markets. GovernDC: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 1996).
ment and foundations can enhance the credit of loan pools
4
	K. Moy and A. Okagaki, “Changing Capital Markets and Their Implicajust as the Ford Foundation did with Self-Help (see p. 16).
tions for Community Development Finance” (Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution, 2001).
The CRF model involved a unique amount of collaboration
5
G. Yago, B. Zeidman, and B. Schmidt, “Creating Capital Jobs and Wealth in
among the ratings agency, the aggregator, foundations, and
Emerging Domestic Markets” (Los Angeles: Milken Institute, 2003).
6
G. Stanton, “Unblocking Obstacles to Capital Markets for Community
individual lenders.

The Challenge of Integration
Can there be a downside to success? Ratliff and Moy raise interesting issues involved in integrating CDFIs into the financial mainstream.8 They note that promising community development products and services are often tested in commu-

Development Lenders” (Manchester, NH: Community Economic Development Press, Southern New Hampshire University, 2003).
7
I am indebted to Wayne Marsden for his initial draft of the case detailed
here.
8
G. Ratliff and K. Moy, “New Pathways to Scale for Community Development Finance” (Washington, DC: Aspen Institute, 2004). Available at
http://www.chicagofed.org/community_development/files/12_2004_
pnv_new_pathways_to_scale.pdf.
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Self-Help’s Affordable Home Loan
Secondary Market Program
Michael Swack and NoÉmi Giszpenc, with Robert Schall

S

should they qualify for a better loan. Consequently Self-Help’s
elf-Help is a leading nonprofit community developSecondary Market loan portfolio has performed well during
ment financial institution (CDFI) headquartered in
the current mortgage crisis when subprime mortgages are deDurham, North Carolina. It consists of the nonprofit
faulting at record rates.
Center for Community Self-Help and two financing affiliates,
In 1998, Self-Help’s secondary market expanded nationally
Self-Help Credit Union and Self-Help Ventures Fund. Its miswith the convergence of two partnerships. First, Self-Help
sion is to create ownership and economic opportunities for
received a $50 million grant from
minorities, women, rural
Although
flexibilities
are
built
into
Self-Help’s
the Ford Foundation (at that time
residents, and low-wealth
families. Since 1980, Self- loan products with lenders, all its products are craft- the largest commitment made by
Help has provided more ed to prevent the presence of multiple exceptions to a philanthropic institution to proconventional credit criteria in the same loan.
mote homeownership), which it
than $5.3 billion in financused as a loan loss reserve to cover
ing to more than 63,000
the credit risk on financed loans. With this reserve, Self-Help
small business enterprises, not-for-profit organizations, and
could guarantee loans with credit characteristics, such as low
homeowners. It operates eight regional offices in North Carocredit scores, high loan-to-value ratios, or no mortgage insurlina and maintains offices in Washington, D.C. and Oakland,
ance, that could have made them ineligible for sale. With SelfCalifornia.
Help bearing most of the risk in case of borrower defaults,
In the 1990s, the Self-Help Ventures Fund began to address
Fannie Mae agreed to purchase the pools of credit-enhanced
the problem of limited capital for affordable home loans. As
mortgages, bundle them into securities, and sell them in the
described elsewhere, lenders providing conventional mortcapital markets. Banks around the country committed to regages had begun to bundle them and sell them to investors on
deploy the proceeds by making additional low-income mortthe secondary market, accessing a virtually limitless supply of
gages.
cash to make more loans. In contrast, “nonconforming” loans
Fannie Mae’s initial commitment was to purchase $2 bilmade by lenders trying to meet Community Reinvestment
lion in Community Advantage Program mortgages over five
Act (CRA) requirements were severely constrained. Having
years. By 2004, Self-Help exceeded its $2 billion target, leverno outlet to sell these loans, lenders would limit the number
aging the Ford grant 40 times over, and Fannie Mae agreed
or stop making them altogether.
to extend the program. Since 1998, Self-Help’s Community
Self-Help’s response began with a pilot program in 1994,
Advantage Home Loan Secondary Market Program has prowhen it purchased a $20 million CRA loan portfolio from a
duced $4.5 billion in mortgages to more than 49,500 families
North Carolina bank looking to increase its originations in
nationwide. The program’s flexible terms accommodate the
support of its CRA program. The lender’s portfolio contained
financing needs of lower-wealth, higher credit-risk borrowloans with high loan-to-value ratios and no mortgage insurers. Borrower income must be at or below 80% of area median
ance and loans to borrowers with blemished credit histories
income or 115% of area median income in low- and moderand limited incomes. This initial stage proved that the risk of
ate-income or minority census tracts. Higher and more flexaffordable home loans could be effectively managed.
ible ratios (e.g., single ratios of 42%, and loan-to-value ratios
These loans were underwritten to avoid the problems assoup to 100%) and minimum down payments as low as 1% or
ciated with the subprime and alt-A loans that are now so toxic
$500 allow low-income borrowers to purchase the homes that
to many of our financial institutions. The loans purchased by
are available in their area. Manual analysis of credit, or lower
Self-Help are 30-year fixed rate loans with no interest rate
than standard credit score floors (as low as 580), help address
re-sets or payment shocks. Borrower income is verified and
the needs of borrowers who may be credit-worthy now but
loans are underwritten for the ability of the borrower to pay
have blemished credit histories. In addition, there may be no
over the full term of the loan. Furthermore there are no premortgage insurance requirement, and it is permitted for clospayment penalties that prevent borrowers from refinancing
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ing costs to be gifted by family or friends. Although such flexibilities are built into Self-Help’s loan products with lenders,
all its products are crafted to prevent the presence of multiple
exceptions to conventional credit criteria in the same loan.
This allows it to expand homeownership boundaries while
maintaining the financial integrity of its loan programs.
After ten years of operating history, studies have shown
that Community Advantage borrowers:
1. have an income 64% of their respective area’s median
2. are 46% minority borrowers
3. saw the median value of their home equity increase
by $17,500 between 1998 and 2002
4. rarely miss a payment: more than 80% of borrowers
have never been delinquent in making a mortgage
payment (still true in 2008, as the financial crisis unfolds)
The loans performed well in the first five years of the program. Loan loss rates were very low (average annual loss rate
of 0.13%) even compared with conventional mortgages. From
the program’s inception to September, 2008, Self-Help has
taken 0.8% loan losses on over $4.5 billion in mortgages, with
this year’s losses higher than past years at around 0.45%. These
rates are very low, even by prime loan standards. A study completed in 2003 by the University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill revealed that 0.7% of Self-Help’s secondary market borrowers had defaulted on their mortgages compared with an
average 1.1% default rate among all borrowers nationwide
during that time period. From January 2007 through June
2008, delinquency rates have risen, as they have throughout
the industry, but this has not led to many more foreclosures.
This year, about 1.2% of Self-Help’s loans will be foreclosed
on, compared to 2.75% of mortgages nationally (by the end of
the second quarter). This may, in part, stem from Self-Help’s
active role in servicing the loans, particularly default management. Self-Help’s loss mitigation strategies include loan
counseling programs, flexible alternatives to foreclosure, and
special initiatives to address sudden and unforeseen events.
Through the Secondary Market Program, Self-Help demonstrated that, with responsible lending, low-wealth families
make good borrowers and sound investments. The Program
affords Fannie Mae an opportunity to better understand the
risks associated with nontraditional mortgages and refine its
performance measurements. Many private financial institutions have also developed products similar to Self-Help’s, significantly expanding the market for responsible low-income
mortgages. This work provides an important counterpoint to

the irresponsible practices that fueled the current subprime
crisis.
For more on this program, contact secondarymarketinfo@self-help.org, or see www.self-help.org.
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The Formation of Community Development
Assurance (CDA)
Wayne A. Marsden
Editor’s Note: Several of the articles in this document point
to the ever-growing capital needs of the community economic development and affordable housing sectors and ways to
attract new and efficient capital sources. The article on the
issuance of a rated asset-backed security by the Community Reinvestment Fund (p. 11), in which we read that several companies rejected CRF-Series 17 for other than credit
quality reasons, demonstrated that seasoned financial guaranty insurance companies lack familiarity with community
economic development assets. This article describes a solution: the creation of a publicly-rated, specialty financial guaranty (municipal bond) insurance company with a focus on
insuring financings in these sectors. This paper will provide
insights into Community Development Assurance (“CDA”),
which is currently seeking some $300 million in initial equity
capital.
Financial guaranty insurance is an irrevocable, non-cancelable, third-party guaranty of the timely payment of principal and interest (as scheduled) on the insured transaction.
The public rating of the financial guarantor transfers to the
transaction, thereby enhancing the borrower’s credit, lowering the cost of borrowing, and improving the marketability of
the transaction. A wider range of potential investors can be
attracted by the added security and liquidity of the insured
transaction.

A New Company to Address the Problem
Today there are no financial guaranty insurance companies
providing credit enhancement guarantees in the community
economic development (“CED”) sectors. There are a number
of reasons: unfamiliarity with the underlying credit quality,
small deal sizes, and differing underwriting processes and
disciplines between the asset types that make up their current core business and CED transactions, which may include
characteristics found in public, mortgage, corporate and
structured finance. There is little incentive for seasoned and
higher rated financial guaranty companies to expand their
focus and serve the CED market segment. The global credit
crisis of 2008, initially caused by the sub-prime mortgage
meltdown and entailing downgrades in the ratings of many
of the financial guarantors, makes it even more unlikely that
these companies will commit the time and resources to serve

the CED sectors.
CDA will be the first financial guaranty insurance (bond
insurance) company with a focus on insuring qualified CED
sector financings. The term CDA refers interchangeably to
Community Development Assurance Holdings, Inc. (a Dela-

CDA will be the first financial guaranty
insurance (bond insurance) company with a focus
on insuring qualified CED sector financings.
ware incorporated holding company) and its wholly-owned
subsidiary, Community Development Assurance Company, a
new state-regulated insurance company, which will become
operational after a planned capital stock offering.
The size and underlying credit quality of the CED sectors
are not well known in the capital markets. It is envisioned
that CDA will help to establish minimum credit underwriting
standards for these sectors. Over time they should become
recognized as the industry standard by those CED originators
and aggregators who look to the capital markets. CDA’s entry
and positioning in the market will provide the targeted sectors with improved access to the capital markets. As both socially responsive and market-return investors become more
aware of the underlying credit quality of the sectors, participants will benefit from a growing supply of available capital at
more attractive rates.

The Focus of CDA
CDA will offer financial guaranty insurance, credit-related
insurance products and technical financial assistance to qualified participants in its targeted sectors. The CDA organization will provide credit enhancement guarantees through the
issuance of insurance policies on financial transactions whose
proceeds will either:
• create new jobs;
• improve community facilities and services;
• support small business finance;
• enhance efficient energy sources or the environment; or
• increase the supply or improve the quality of affordable
housing.
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Target Markets and Business Types
CDA will target the following types of municipal and CED
financial transactions in both the primary (new issue) and
secondary (seasoned, previously issued) markets:
• Public and Small Business Finance, including:
- small business loans;
- affordable housing (single and multi-family): workforce, military, immigrant, Native American, people
of color and senior housing;
- industrial and economic development;
- education: charter schools, vocational schools,
community colleges and other post-secondary institutions;
- lease financings;
- community service and facility improvements;
- nonprofits;
- environmental, resource recovery and alternative
energy sources; and
- healthcare: long-term, specialty and communityfocused.
• Structured Finance, such as:
- asset-backed securities backed by: small business
loans, micro-finance loans, financial institution
capital notes, trade receivables, tax credits, and
lease receivables; and
- mortgage-backed securities: single- and multi-family residential with an affordable component, immigrant mortgages, workforce housing, military, and
senior housing.
CDA will not insure derivative or synthetic CDOs. It will
require “hard” asset collateral and iron-clad security provisions.
• Possible specialty products may include:
- portfolio insurance;
- deposit and loan guarantees;
- performance / surety bonds;
- forward insurance commitments; and
- credit protection insurance products.
• Financial technical advisory: on a fee basis, the service
company will provide:
- deal structuring, when insurance is not used;
- social impact reporting;
- portfolio credit monitoring / surveillance; and
- administration and management of established
guarantee funds.

In the future CDA will consider insuring international
CED transactions.
CDA will be responsive in balancing the needs of institutional investors and CED sector participants. The primary
beneficiaries of CDA’s presence in the market will include,
among others:
• Community development and small business loan originators, such as banks, CDFIs, and community development credit unions;
• socially responsive investors;
• assets aggregators, investment managers;
• affordable housing mortgage originators;
• affordable housing developers and managers;
• community development corporations;
• community service providers; and
• related organizations.
At the same time, CDA will be addressing the needs of
philanthropic and mission-related investors looking for, in
addition to social impact, leverage of their limited resources,
sustainability, credit analysis, and deal structuring. The pri-

By offering products targeted to CED sectors that
also conform to the expectations of institutional
investors, CDA will build a bridge from philanthropy and community developers to the capital
markets.
mary beneficiaries of CDA’s core business, however, will be
institutional investors. These capital market players are looking for return, security, soundness, ratings, standardization
and scale, Community Reinvestment Act/socially responsible
investor (CRA/SRI) credit, tax credits, and credit surveillance
(monitoring). By offering products targeted to CED sectors
that also conform to the expectations of institutional investors, CDA will build a bridge from philanthropy and community developers to the capital markets.

The Importance of Ratings
CDA plans to seek an “A” claims-paying ability rating by at
least one national statistical rating organization (Standard &
Poor’s, Moody’s, or Fitch). CDA requires a public rating to
facilitate business opportunities with its strategic business
partners, such as reinsurance companies and other financial
institutions. CDA intends to maintain sufficient capital levels
and be managed to sustain its public rating.
A financial guaranty insurance company’s public rating
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conveys (“passes through”) to the transactions it insures as
evidence of the credit enhancement to investors. An insured
and rated transaction pays less interest, while improving its
marketability.
The ultimate public ratings on CDA-qualified transactions
will be based on:
1. the structure of the transaction;
2. credit enhancements within the structure of each transaction, including, among other things, over-collateralization, reserve accounts, interest spread accounts, and
debt service reserves;
3. primary financial guaranty insurance;
4. letters of credit;
5. reinsurance;
6. other third-party guarantees; and
7. first loss coverage.

CDA’s Equity Investors
CDA should be attractive to both mission-related and market-driven equity investors. The benefits include: doubledigit rates of return; a public-purpose business strategy with
on-going tracking of social impact and likely exit strategies;
bringing new efficient sources of capital investment into community development sectors; and revenue opportunities from
collaborating on proprietary insurance products.
Perhaps the greatest benefit that CDA offers to missionrelated investors is a very high leverage ratio, providing a big
bang for socially-responsive bucks. A direct philanthropic
or social investment or guarantee leads to only a one-to-one
impact—$1 million financed is $1 million financed, end of
story. An equity investment in CDA, on the other hand, can
be multiplied many times. The plan assumes a relatively conservative leverage ratio of more than 40-to-1 in total principal
and interest exposure to capital and equivalents (the historic
industry average was as high as 160-to-1).
The substantial economic impact comes with a healthy rate
of return to equity investors. CDA will be managed to achieve
a greater than 15% rate of return on its equity, in addition to
any capital gains that come from stock appreciation.

CDA intends to be actively involved in structuring each
transaction it insures and will rely on input from potential
institutional investors. When appropriate, CDA will co-insure or reinsure (cede) senior credit tranches to higher-rated
primary insurance and reinsurance companies. Transaction structures may also use “cut-through endorsements” by
which the rating of the reinsurer will convey, and thereby apCDA Business Objectives
ply, to the specific transaction. Possible reinsurers will include
mono-line reinsurance companies, banks, pension funds,
CDA’s primary business objective is to provide capital marfoundations, mortgage insurance companies and multi-line
kets access to the CED sectors, which will ultimately lower
insurance companies with Financial Enhancement Ratings
CED issuer borrowing costs. The company will facilitate and
(“FERs,” issued by Standard & Poor’s) of “A ” or higher.
structure transactions of near-investment grade credit quality
Another advantage of a public rating accrues to the comthat meet its own minimum credit standards and criteria. A
pany’s reinsurers and co-insurers in the form of reduced
CDA policy will enhance the credit quality and subsequent
risk-based capital charges.
credit rating of securities
Like many regulated finanand obligations issued by
Acquiring insurance on a transaction from a rated
cial institutions, insurance
qualified sector participants.
company takes the “story” out of the instrument: investors
companies are required to
More importantly, as invesno longer need to know very much about it—its origin,
maintain risk-weighted retors become more familiar
purpose, beneficiaries, etc.—to decide whether or not to
serves. If the risks retained
with CDA and the underlybuy it.
and assumed are welling strength of the issues it
understood and rated, the
insures, market access will
capital requirements will be correspondingly lower, allowing
be enhanced, resulting in lower borrowing costs.
greater leverage and higher returns to equity.
A simplified example transaction will show the economic
Ratings reduce uncertainty and increase standardization.
benefit of a CDA credit enhancement. Take a $10 million,
Thus, acquiring insurance on a transaction from a rated com20-year, tax-exempt, “BB equivalent” unrated, charter school
pany takes the “story” out of the instrument: investors no lonfinancing with an uninsured 6.75% coupon. If this bond isger need to know very much about it—its origin, purpose,
sue is insured by CDA, the resulting “A” rating on the issue
beneficiaries, etc.—to decide whether or not to buy it. A pubwould generate an apparent yield savings (for simplicity’s
lic rating also aids in mark-to-market valuations.
sake) of approximately 1%. With lower interest payments on
the bonds, even after deducting the CDA insurance premium,
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the bond issuers would save the present value of $275,000 in
debt service.
The market will accept lower yields as it becomes familiar
with CDA’s unencumbered financial strength and its conservative underwriting standards. A CDA policy will improve
the quality of the transactions by providing an unconditional
and irrevocable guaranty of the timely payment of principal
and interest as scheduled. CDA may insure entire transactions or just subordinate credit tranches, or it may provide
first loss coverage on a selective basis. In contrast with bank
letters or certain other credit enhancements, CDA can provide longer-term guarantees, because in the event of a default,
there is no acceleration of debt service. In the event that the
issuer is unable to make a scheduled debt service payment,
a claim will be submitted by the trustee on the transaction,
CDA will make the missed payments on schedule, while it
initiates remedial action to resolve the cause of the default.
When the problem is corrected and the issuer experiences a
positive cash flow and resumes its debt service payments to
investors, it will be required to repay CDA for its missed payments, plus interest.
CDA will require that all financing submissions have an
underlying credit quality of “BB” or higher, with a high probability of making debt service and with iron-clad security
provisions. CDA will use its expertise and competencies in
credit analysis, risk management and surveillance (monitoring) to analyze, select, and manage transactions.
When analyzing a submitted transaction, CDA’s credit
underwriters will consider: use of proceeds; essentiality;
likelihood of paying debt service (in terms of financial ability and willingness); authority to enter into the transaction;
deal structure; and covenants and protections (security, collateral and guarantees). CDA will publish detailed underwriting guidelines and criteria for each financing type and asset
type it insures. CDA will also require security provisions
and financial covenants, such as gross revenue pledges, state
aid intercepts, mortgages, funded debt service and liquidity
reserves, additional debt restrictions, etc. With all of these
underwriting measures, CDA should experience “zero loss
probability in the event a claim is paid”.
CDA will employ other measures to manage potential
credit risk exposure. These include: use of a profitability
model, pro-active portfolio surveillance, reinsurance, standby
credit and capital facilities.

CDA Business Plan
CDA’s financial results will be based on its two operating business segments: bond insurance on municipal and CED bonds
and selected structured finance (asset-backed securities) as
well as financial and technical advisory services. A range of
services and products are being designed for issuers and institutional investors. Each transaction will be structured to
attract a wide universe of institutional buyers. In fact, CDA
plans to employ at least one marketing professional to focus
exclusively on developing relationships with institutional
buyers. In general, CDA will be opportunistic in its business development activities by exploiting its core competencies: credit analysis, risk management, surveillance, financial
soundness and sector knowledge.
The launch of CDA promises to put in place an essential
piece of the puzzle to capital market access for the community
development and affordable housing sectors.
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The Commercial Paper Co-op
Charles Tansey, Neighborworks America

Banks allow their best customers to issue commercial paper, borrowing from the bank at the prime rate, or a spread
Other articles have described the advantages of selling assets
over Federal Reserve funds; the London InterBank Borrowsuch as community development loans to the secondary capiing Rate (LIBOR), which is the cost at which banks lend to
tal markets as a way to replenish liquidone another; or another similar
ity and originate more loans. Some larger
index. The co-op is designed to
The co-op is designed to help
CDFIs are already aggregating loans from
help banks provide the same
banks provide the same flexibility
smaller CDFIs or from conventional lendflexibility and cost advantage
and cost advantage to their best
ers. But before those aggregators can offer
to their best CDFI clients. CDCDFI clients.
asset-backed securities to investors, they
FIs do not have access to this
must establish a sufficient volume of loans.
kind of funding primarily beIn the interim, aggregators must “warecause they lack access to the commercial paper market. They
house” the loans, holding them in a portfolio until they can be
lack this access because of the size of borrowing need and bebundled as securities and sold. Each CDFI providing aggregacause rating agencies are unfamiliar with the types of assets
tion and warehousing services must obtain a separate line of
that CDFIs originate. The co-op is designed to overcome both
credit from its bank.
impediments by aggregating CDFI borrowings so they are of
To expand the range of borrowing options available to
sufficient scale and by placing CDFI secured and unsecured
high-capacity CDFIs and help them to lower their funding
obligations in a funding framework that obtains the highest
costs, members of the Financial Innovations Roundtable have
quality ratings and lowest available rates.
proposed creating a Commercial Paper Cooperative owned by
CDFIs. The co-op would provide its members access to the
Summary of the Co-op Proposal
commercial paper market, and reduce the time, complexity,
and cost of borrowing. Due to the current credit crisis in 2008- Six large, high-capacity CDFIs are forming a cooperative to
access cutting-edge, short-term funding. The co-op has the
09, this effort is temporarily “on hold.”
following features:
• $100 million in size, with up to $75 million extended to
Commercial Paper’s Relevance to CDFIs
the six CDFIs at any time
Commercial paper is a form of short-term borrowing (an
• Warehouse financing to the six member CDFIs in
unsecured promissory note) used by many corporations to
amounts up to $15 million each
finance a wide range of assets with diverse maturities and
• Sub-limits for co-op members relative to the type and
varying levels of risk. Assets financed include credit card debt,
quality of the assets being financed by the CDFIs
used car loans, home mortgages, and small business loans.
• Ability of CDFIs to borrow for 30 days and roll over the
Although the maximum maturity of commercial paper is 270
maturity until the pledged assets are sold or replaced;
days, most commercial paper issuers roll over their notes at
CDFIs borrow for periods matching the length of time
maturity, effectively borrowing long-term at short-term rates.
they hold the assets, but not for more than 270 days
They are able to do this because banks and other large finan• Access to a range of pricing options, including commercial institutions provide a combination of liquidity and credit
cial paper, LIBOR, prime, Federal Reserve funds, and
enhancement to protect the commercial paper investor from
other indices
any losses from the inherent asset-liability mismatch. Com• Approximately $20 million in capital from foundations
mercial paper (unlike bonds) is also exempt from Security and
and social investors
Exchange Commission registration, which lowers issuance
• Loans to CDFIs are secured by the loans that CDFIs
costs. For most institutions, particularly in the financial sector,
pledge. Rather than paper, CDFIs use the Mortgage
commercial paper provides the least expensive form of (nonElectronic Registration System for tracking and monideposit) financing over time.
toring security.

The Purpose of the Co-op
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• Stop-loss triggers to ensure quality collateral and compliance by CDFIs
• A liquidity facility (such as a letter of credit) provided
by banks guaranteeing payments of principal and interest to investors, enabling the co-op to issue top-quality,
short-term notes to a commercial paper conduit that
issues commercial paper to the public.

Summary of the Benefits
Reduced Rates
Several CDFIs borrow from banks to fund the origination and
aggregation of loans they intend to sell. In return for funding,
CDFIs pledge the loans they are originating and aggregating.
When they sell the loans, they pay off the warehousing lines.
At present, the warehousing lines are individually negotiated,
and the terms and conditions vary considerably from one
CDFI to the next. By gaining access to the commercial paper
market via a centralized cooperative, participating CDFIs can
minimize their borrowing rates and the risk associated with
working with a limited number of lenders.
Reduced Costs
The pledging process involves, among other things, the physical transfer of promissory notes and related documents from
a CDFI to the lender when the CDFI borrows, and the return
of the physical documents when the loan is paid off. The proposed framework will enable CDFI participants to transfer
documents electronically instead. Although the co-op still
cannot perfect a security interest electronically (that is, take
all the necessary legal steps and file all the required papers
to establish a claim on the asset), the electronic transfer does
reduce the potential for error and speeds the transaction.
With its capital and layered protections, the co-op insulates
the commercial paper investors and banks that are providing
the liquidity facility from the risk of eliminating paper transactions. In addition to the time and cost associated with this
activity, the warehousing lines often involve annual renewal,
renewal fees, legal costs and other requirements. The co-op
will consolidate and absorb these on behalf of the participating CDFIs.
Increased Flexibility
Many warehousing lines provided by banks restrict the borrower to pledging only new loans. One of the chief objectives
of the co-op is to enable the participating CDFIs to pledge
existing loans that conform to the allowable terms and conditions for each asset class. Clearly seasoned loans are less

risky than new loans, and in addition to providing the CDFI
borrower with more flexibility, this expansion also produces
a potentially higher quality of collateral. The moral hazard inherent in this structure is mitigated because the borrowers
also own the co-op; there is no incentive to pass on or pledge
weak loans (which in any case would not be accepted if they
did not fit the previously agreed-on standards).

Access to the Rating Agencies
One of the chief benefits of this structure is that participating
CDFIs can place their assets in a facility that rating agencies
will monitor or evaluate on a dynamic basis. Participation
will also allow CDFIs to showcase their capacity to service
assets, another key area that rating agencies do not currently
monitor routinely evaluate. Exposure in both areas will help
move CDFIs toward the ultimate objective of being rated on

The co-op, however, is not designed to replace
existing bank warehousing lines. Its purpose is to
augment existing relationships.
their organizational and financial strength. The electronic
rather than paper-based security interests (claims on assets)
of the co-op could accelerate this process. These benefits are
not limited to the participating CDFIs. Over time, as the exposure expands to more CDFIs, this structure will accommodate greater risk parameters, including unsecured loans.
The co-op, however, is not designed to replace existing
bank warehousing lines or other lending facilities. Although
participants may choose to reduce the lines, the co-op cannot replace the relationship or the range of funding options
that banks can provide. Its purpose is to augment existing
relationships and provide the key banks with an alternative,
and potentially more effective and remunerative, method for
lending to the community development field (see “Structure
of the Co-op,” below).

Potential Participants
The six potential participants include:
• Self-Help (single family first mortgages)
• Neighborhood Housing Services of America (singlefamily first and second mortgages)
• NCB Capital Impact (multifamily and community facility first mortgages)
• Community Reinvestment Fund (small business first
and second mortgages)
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• Impact Community Capital (multifamily mortgages)
• New Hampshire Community Loan Fund (multiple
types of loans; see Manufactured Housing article,
p. 38)
Each of the six participants has assets in excess of $50 million, has been in existence for more than 10 years, and has
warehousing lines from commercial banks to support their
borrowing and aggregation activities. None of the participants
has been delinquent on any of its loan agreements in the past
10 years.

Structure of the Co-op
Existing Commercial Paper Conduit
A number of lending institutions serving the CDFI industry
have multiple commercial paper conduits. Using an existing
conduit will reduce the start-up costs. However, the primary
purpose is to ensure that the funding obtained for CDFI borrowing is indistinguishable from any other paper in the market. One of the chief objectives of the co-op is to eliminate
the need for subsidy and the collateral consumption of scarce
social investment and foundation resources. In keeping with
market practice, the conduit must assure commercial investors they will be paid. As a result, the conduit requires that the
co-op provide a 100% liquidity facility that guarantees timely
payment of principal and interest. Under this structure, market investors will not look to the underlying CDFIs or their
assets, nor will the rating agencies need to evaluate them. In

What’s In It for the Banks?
The chief difference between the proposed co-op and existing bank
warehousing lines is that the banks’ obligor (debtor) is the co-op.
Rather than having a direct security interest in the loans being warehoused by six different CDFIs, banks will have a direct security interest in the notes of CDFIs, which are secured, in turn, by those loans.
In effect the banks are one step removed from the assets.
However, in substitution for the direct claim on assets, the banks
will receive the following:
1. First loss: A direct claim on co-op capital. The capital serves
as a first loss against the total $100 million value of the facility. Because the co-op is designed to generate surpluses, this is
likely to grow as a percentage of the total facility.
2. Asset Security: First lien interest in the co-op’s assets. The
co-op’s assets consist of CDFI notes that are at least 90% secured by mortgages.
3. Collateral Cushion: The co-op will make advances against
CDFI short-term secured notes on a borrowing base formula
that provides a collateral cushion specific to the assets being
financed.

effect, CDFI assets will benefit from an A-1/P-1 rating without
being scrutinized by either investors or rating agencies.

Banks
The co-op will work with a lead bank to arrange a syndicate (a
group of banks that share equally in the risk) for the liquidity
and credit enhancement features. The lead institution will first
invite banks currently providing credit or warehouse lines to
the participating CDFIs. This will limit the learning curve associated with the inherent risks, which has proved a material
impediment for many conventional lenders and capital markets. The co-op will provide the banks with reduced risk-based
capital allocation against the same assets; the same CRA benefits that pertain to bank warehousing lines; and at minimum,
a market return. (See also box on banks, below.)

The Co-op
The co-op will be CDFI-owned with the sole purpose to enable participating CDFIs to access funds provided by the commercial paper market and banks on a consistent, low-cost,
easy-to-use basis. The co-op will require the following of the
participating CDFIs: regularly reported, sound performance
data; maintenance of financial condition; compliance with
stop-issuance triggers; and security interests appropriate to
the transaction. The stop-issuance triggers and security interests are similar to those required by the banks. The co-op will
have an administrator and a transfer agent who are distinct
from the banks in the liquidity facility. The co-op will also hire

4.	Liquidity: The co-op will maintain a minimum of 15% of the
total facility in high-quality investment-grade instruments.
5. Early Warning: The co-op will enforce “stop issue” triggers
designed to identify deteriorating trends at a member CDFI
and to terminate its ability to roll notes over if the trends are
negative.
6. The Capacity of the Obligors: Members are selected on
the basis of their size, longevity, and performance.
7. A Diversified Portfolio: For the same dollar of community
investment, the bank gets a much more diversified portfolio in
terms of obligor, geography, asset class, and risk.
In effect, the banks will be gaining a first loss reserve, liquidity, trigger mechanisms, and portfolio diversification they previously did not
have. These factors enable the banks to reduce their capital allocation
against community development assets of the type being financed.
The estimated capital allocation banks must set aside is 0.58%
(the norm is 6% to 8% capital set-asides on the balance sheet). If the
bank charges 0.375% as expected (see “Cost Assumptions,” below) for
the liquidity facility, the return on capital to banks is 64.66%, which
should be reasonably attractive.
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one to two full-time employees to manage the interests of the
CDFI owners. The configuration of the staffing is to be determined.

CDFI Borrowers
CDFI participants will have the option to borrow under their
existing credit facilities with their banks or with the co-op.
Depending on events in the market on any given day, the
co-op may or may not be more attractive than the financing
provided by the banks. As with their corporate counterparts,
it will be up to the CDFI treasurers to determine which funding source is preferable. The procedures for borrowing under
warehousing lines are currently cumbersome, costly, and paper-intensive. The co-op will minimize the time and money
associated with the secured CDFI notes.

Grants and Program-Related Investments
To attract the liquidity facility from banks as required by
the conduit,
the co-op will
a p p r o a c h Members of the co-op, corporations,
financial inwho are also the bor- stitutions, and
foundations rowers, will determine for capital from
both grants
the level of surpluses. and programrelated investments (for
more about PRIs, see Heron Foundation article, p. 27). The
present target is for $5 million in grants and $15 million in
program-related investments at 1% for 10 years (although

more might be needed in the current market). Together with
start-up costs, this amount will serve as the only social investment subsidy in the co-op structure, as the co-op is designed
to be self-supporting and generate surpluses. The capital is
expected to grow over time via the co-op surpluses. Members
of the co-op, who are also the borrowers, will determine the
level of surpluses.

Borrowing Process
A CDFI would access the commercial paper market in the
following steps:
1. It asks to borrow $5 million from the co-op for 30 days to
fund loans it is warehousing.
2. The co-op immediately borrows $5 million for 30 days
from the commercial paper conduit. The conduit has
been selected by the co-op to issue commercial paper on
the co-op’s behalf. The conduit is operated by a major financial institution.
3. The conduit issues A-1/P-1 rated commercial paper in
the amount of $5 million for 30 days. The commercial
paper is purchased by institutional investors.
4. The co-op, which has issued short-term promissory notes
to the conduit in the amount of $5 million for 30 days,
receives the proceeds of the conduit’s commercial paper
issue.
5. The CDFI, which has issued short-term promissory notes
to the co-op, receives the proceeds from these notes.
6. The transactions are simultaneous.

Chart 1: Commercial Paper Co-op
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30 days at a time to benefit from the lowest pricing and roll
over three or four times before repaying through loan sale or
other means. It also assumes that funding needs typically do
not exceed 120 days and in no event exceed 270 days.
At present, only loans that are funded by banks under their
warehousing lines will be eligible as assets to be financed.
These loans and mortgages are typically in the process of being aggregated by the CDFI for sale, securitization or other
form of off-balance sheet placement. The co-op will also seek
to include loans and mortgages that have already been originated, are seasoned and are on the balance sheet of the borrowing CDFI. The
Key Cost Assumptions
key focus for the co-op will be on deFees:
0.25% for the Letter of Credit, payable quarterly each year
veloping a relatively homogeneous set
0.125% for the bank syndicate manager payable quarterly each year
of asset classes with a portfolio distribuSet-up fee to be determined.
tion that is compatible with CDFI participant needs.
Management:	Estimated at $250,000 per year, rising at the rate of inflation. This is probably

At the end of 30 days, the CDFI sells the warehoused loans
and retires the debt to the co-op, which in turn retires the debt
to the conduit. If the warehoused loans are not sold, or if new
loans are to be warehoused at maturity, the CDFI may pay the
notes off with the issuance of new notes. This effectively rolls
the debt over and extends the term of the financing. Most entities participating in the commercial paper market borrow on
30-day maturities to get the lowest rates, and they tend to roll
them over at maturity.
The co-op assumes most borrowers will want to borrow for

high. It is unclear whether the co-op will require more than one full-time
employee to manage the interests of the members. This need will be determined by the co-op members.

Analysis:

The CDFI Assessment and Rating System and/or other annual financial
analyses for evaluating the financial health and performance of the six
CDFI members is expected to cost $10,000 per analysis.

Dealer:

The fee for the administrator/dealer is 0.25% on total outstanding obligations.

Miscellaneous: Miscellaneous expense allowance of $50,000, rising at the rate of inflation.
Charge-offs:	Assumptions about charge-offs depend on the risk allocation among asset
classes and the total outstanding obligations. This assumption errs on the
side of caution given that none of the CDFI borrowers has been delinquent
on loans during the past ten years and there have been no charge-offs. Nevertheless, the estimated cushion allows for alterations in other items.
• Collateral reserves at CDFIs are calculated at ten times the estimated
charge-off rate.
• Co-op capital required is also 10 times the estimated charge-off rate.

On the revenue side:
Interest Rate:

The co-op will charge its borrower-members 75 basis points (0.75%) over
the A1/P1 commercial paper rate. Borrowers will also have the option to
borrow at 75 basis points over LIBOR, or at the equivalent spread over
alternative bank cost of funds. This spread is designed to cover a large portion of the costs of the co-op.

Investments:

The co-op will invest contributed capital and PRI funds, as well as cash, in
high-quality, short-term and long-term investments, earning revenue and
contributing to surpluses.

Looking to the Future
Over time, the performance of the coop should allow more flexibility and
fewer costs. As the CDFIs and their
assets perform, the level of first loss
protection can be reduced; the overall
facility can increase from $100 million
to $200 million, $500 million, or more.
Alternatively, the co-op can introduce
higher risk or less common forms of
assets, such as social enterprise, predevelopment or nonprofit working capital
assets. The co-op might also fund positions longer than 30 days.
One of the most important effects of
the co-op will be the emergence of data
sets of sufficient size and quality to establish solid conclusions about the performance of community development
lenders and the loans that they make.
This should contribute to the ratability
of the CDFI participants, and eventually to the ratability of other CDFIs and
their assets.

Charles Tansey is the author of Securitizing Organizational Risk in Capital Markets: Wins, Losses, and Opportunities for
CDFIs, which details the Commercial Paper Co-op Project, the Capital Exchange, the Mini-Fed, and aligned efforts to access the
capital markets, along with the reasons for their mixed results and recommendations for future success, particularly once the current turmoil in markets has eased.
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Expanding Philanthropy: Mission-related
Investing at the F.B. Heron Foundation
Michael Swack, Carsey Institute, University of New Hampshire

F

ounded in 1992 with the mission of helping people
The Difference Between Mission Investing and
and communities to help themselves, the F.B. Heron
Socially Responsible Investing
Foundation came into being during one of the greatest
As defined by FSG Social Impact Advisors in its report “Comeconomic booms in U.S. history. The strong financial markets
pounding Impact: Mission Investing by U.S. Foundations,” misof the 1990s not only spurred rapid growth of Heron’s asset
sion investments are “financial investments made with the intenbase but also served to reinforce its focus on asset building
tion of (1) furthering a foundation’s mission and (2) recovering the
principal invested or earning financial return.” Socially responsible
and community economic development, given that so many
investing focuses primarily on (negative) social screening and
Americans did not benefit from the wealth generated in the
proxy activity in public equities, while mission-related investing is
heated economy.
a proactive approach in use across asset classes.
Faced with the challenges of making effective grants and
managing a growing endowment, Heron’s board of directors The Road to Mission-related Investing1
understood all too well that the scope of the social problems
Developing a mission-related investment strategy did not
it sought to address required more significant resources than
happen overnight. Heron spent time refining its mission and
its mandated 5% payout. At a regularly scheduled meeting in
determining
By adopting an incre- how it
1996, Heron’s board reviewed a particular investment mancould be enhanced
mental philosophy, the
ager’s performance for what seemed like hours, leaving little
through a pro- foundation was able to test a c t i v e
time for program matters. This imbalance caused the board to
i n v e s t m e n t the concept without making strategy.
step back and evaluate the effectiveness of the foundation.
Initially, there
was some
any major missteps.
After much discussion, the board suggested that because of
uncertainty
about
Heron’s social mission and tax-exempt status, the foundation
how far and how fast the foundation could move, and thereshould be more than essentially a private investment company
fore a reluctance to establish specific mission-related investthat uses its excess cash flow for charitable purposes. Withment targets.
out changes, in the board’s view, there could be very little to
By adopting an incremental philosophy, the foundation
distinguish the foundation from a conventional investment
was able to test the concept without making any major mismanager.
steps. Staff was encouraged to explore opportunities in core
The board began to view the 5% payout requirement as the
program areas that would build on existing networks and exnarrowest expression of the foundation’s philanthropic goals.
pertise, and to share lessons learned along the way.
By looking to the other 95% of assets, the “corpus,” the board
The First Steps. Heron’s first step was to transfer some of
could conceive a broader philanthropic “toolbox” capable of
its actively managed investments into index and enhanced
greater social impact than grant-making alone.
index funds. This decision was based on research, unrelated
Spurred by this “tipping point,” the board encouraged staff
to mission investing, that showed no substantial long-term
to explore ways in which Heron could engage more of its asactive management premium in many core asset classes. In
sets through a combination of grant-making and “missionaddition to reduced investment-management fees, taking this
related” investment strategies. The board made a deliberate
step allowed Heron to redirect its redecision to find ways to leverage an in“We recognized that the endowment, sources away from managing dozens
creasing amount of Heron’s resources
of active investment managers and
in pursuit of its mission and therefore left perpetually warehoused, was losing
the time value of its potential mission toward building a mission-related
maximize the foundation’s impact in
investment portfolio. Investment
impact,” says William M. Dietel, the
low-income communities.
performance is now as good as when
foundation’s chair.
“We recognized that the endowthe entire portfolio was under active
ment, left perpetually warehoused,
management but comes at a lower cost.
was losing the time value of its potential mission impact,” says
Assembling the Skills: Internal Capacity and Investment
William M. Dietel, the foundation’s chair. “We wanted to beConsultants. The board soon realized the extent to which it
have more responsibly as stewards of philanthropic funds.”
was challenging conventional thinking. As a result, the board
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decided to build internal management capacity, bringing certain functions in-house. In addition to encouraging staff to
take advantage of training opportunities, the board authorized
a new position, vice president of investments, that would be
separate from the finance and administration functions. The
foundation also conducted a search for an investment consulting firm that would appreciate Heron’s commitment to
mission-related investing, eventually retaining Evaluation Associates in 2004.
Learning from Foundations and Other Institutional Investors. Early on, Heron looked to other foundations and institutional investors (including commercial banks, insurers,
and public pension funds) for examples of alternative asset
deployment. Heron learned about below-market investments
from both the Ford and MacArthur Foundations, the earliest and largest practitioners of program-related investments.
Heron also found willing partners among large commercial
banks, which, motivated by the federal Community Reinvestment Act, invested in so-called double-bottom-line real estate
and venture-oriented private equity funds as a way to deliver
both market-rate financial returns and positive social impact.
In expanding its role beyond that of traditional grant-maker,
Heron found itself in the company of other types of institutional investors and gained access to potential partners and
co-investors.
Looking First at Existing Relationships. Through partnerships with community-based organizations and financial intermediaries, Heron has witnessed firsthand the transformative power of investing in America’s low-income communities—primarily through home ownership, enterprise development, and access to capital. As such, Heron determined that its
grantee pool was a natural place for below-market programrelated investments, which the foundation began to make in
1997. Because Heron understands the management and operational histories of its grantees, the quality of the underwriting
is often better than it otherwise might be. Today, nearly 75%
of the foundation’s program-related investments are in groups
with which Heron has or has had an established relationship.

Program-Related Investments
The Internal Revenue Service defines these charitable investments
using three criteria: (1) the investment’s primary purpose must be
to advance the foundation’s charitable objectives; (2) neither the
production of income nor the appreciation of property can be a
significant purpose; and (3) the funds cannot be used directly or
indirectly for lobbying or political purposes. Under these criteria,
all program-related investments are mission-related investments
because they contribute to the foundation’s mission. However, not
all mission-related investments are program-related investments
given that some mission-related investments seek a market return.

Bridging the Program and Investment Functions. Initial
discussions with grantees about potential program-related
investments began with Heron’s program staff, who reviewed
business plans and discussed capital needs, management capabilities, and financial projections, but who also needed guidance in understanding the investment risks involved and how
best to structure deals to mitigate those risks. As the foundation’s prospecting efforts turned into a pipeline of tangible
deals, Heron began a conscious effort to bridge the program
and investment functions—a significant departure from how
typical foundations are organized and staffed. Although many
program staff members appreciated the benefits of having access to a new philanthropic tool, others did not feel as comfortable with the training, mentoring, and analysis that making program-related investments demanded. The result was
some staff turnover through attrition—not uncommon with
any significant programmatic change. In replacing staff, Heron looked for, and attracted, officers who felt comfortable with
the financial analysis and the investment process. It took time,
but Heron now enjoys a collaborative model, with staff in the
two functional areas working side by side, and investment staff
as the “tie breaker.”
Creating a Pipeline of Market-Rate Investment Opportunities. Heron’s staff works to build the foundation’s marketrate portfolio of mission-related investments in three primary
ways:
1. Conducting active outreach efforts to identify opportunities within various asset classes;
2. Creatively adapting traditional investment vehicles and
asset managers to mission goals; and,
3. Researching and developing new investment vehicles,
such as the Community Investment Index, a positively
screened, best-in-class method used to identify publicly
traded companies with superior records of engaging
with underserved communities (see box on page 29).
Leadership for Successful Implementation. To be successful in developing a mission-related investing strategy, a foundation must have the support of its board. While a foundation’s executive and professional staff may lead the board to
a discussion of mission-related investing, a foundation will
miss the transformative effects of this shift in strategy without a true and dedicated commitment of its board. The staff,
then, is responsible for successful implementation. The success of mission-related investing relies, in large part, on the
ability of front-line staff members to think creatively and analytically about where and how they will identify, recommend
and underwrite investment opportunities. A chief executive
officer who encourages openness and flexibility in achieving
goals will engender confidence in staff members responsible
for implementation.
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The Community Investment Index

Developing a Mission-related Investment
Continuum

In 2005, with assistance from Innovest Strategic Value Advisors,
Heron created a methodology for selecting companies in each industry in the Standard and Poor’s 900 on the basis of the quality
of their engagement with low- and moderate income communities
in the United States. The resulting Community Investment Index
takes into account corporate strategy, workforce development,
wealth creation, and corporate philanthropy.
Past performance of the selected equities looked promising, so
Heron committed a portion of its capital to test the index’s approach. Managed by State Street Global Advisors, the index returned 15.0% in 2006, versus 15.3% for the Standard and Poor’s 900
and 13.2% for the Domini 400, the most widely used benchmark
for large-capitalization, socially responsible equity investing. Heron
is creating a commingled investment product that the foundation
hopes will be attractive to other institutions committed to investing
in low-income communities. The performance of the index continues to compare well during the current market turmoil. In 2008, the
index fell 17.99% in the first three quarters of the year, bringing the
performance since inception (from November 2005 to September
2008) to -0.30%. The S&P 900 total return fell 18.89% in the first
thee quarters of 2008, and the Domini 400 fell 17.20%. In the fall of
2008, both benchmarks were just about at the same level they were
three years before.

To sort through the opportunities that mission-related investing presents, the foundation’s staff developed the “Mission-related Investment Continuum,” which lays out a set of
asset classes available to mission-related investors. On the left
side are below-market investments, including grants and program-related investments (private equity, subordinated loans,
senior loans, and cash). On the right side are mission-related
investments that generate market rates of return (cash, fixed
income, public equity, and private equity). The least risky investments are in the center of the continuum; the risk level
increases as one moves toward either end. (Guarantees are
the exception, as their risk level depends on how they are
structured.)
In developing the continuum, Heron staff considered the
central tenets of traditional investing discipline: asset allocation, performance benchmarking, and security or manager
selection. Heron’s asset-allocation policy has not changed
to accommodate its mission-related investing practice. That

Chart 2: Heron’s Mission-related Investment Continuum
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strategy is based on total return, as well as liquidity and diversification, which determines how its investments should be distributed among different types of investment classes and is paramount to portfolio performance. Rather, the foundation considers mission-related investing opportunities within the overall
asset-allocation framework of a well-diversified portfolio.
Heron also has identified appropriate performance benchmarks by asset class to evaluate relative performance and to
compare both risk and return for its mission-related investments versus standard, capital market measures. In choosing
its mission-related investments, staff consider several variables, including track record, investment strategy, and market
opportunity.

Heron has identified appropriate performance
benchmarks by asset class to evaluate relative
performance and to compare both risk and return for its mission-related investments versus
standard.
Heron has taken advantage of mission-related investment
opportunities across the continuum. In some ways, Heron’s
mission is well suited for such opportunities. Foundations
that are active in fields of more limited investment and lending may find it challenging to identify the same breadth of opportunities. As such, not all foundations will employ missionrelated investing along the entire continuum; one or two asset
classes may be sufficient. In these cases, determining where to
start depends on opportunities presented that are most consistent with mission and investment goals.

Examples of Below-Market Investments
As its program-related investment portfolio grows, Heron has
found many investment opportunities with different risk and
return characteristics:
Grants. Even though they provide no financial return,
grants arguably represent the riskiest below-market “asset
class.” Grant-making helps the foundation establish and develop relationships with organizations on the road to “investment readiness”;
Cash. Insured deposits in fledgling, rural credit unions
at below-market rates through intermediaries such as the
National Federation of Community Development Credit
Unions;
Senior loans to small business loan funds, such as North
Carolina-based Self-Help Ventures Fund, that invest in businesses and community facilities in low-income communities;

Using Grants and Program-Related Investments
Together
The Heron Foundation provides both grant support and
investment to The Reinvestment Fund (TRF), a national
leader in financing neighborhood revitalization. Grants
help fund operating costs, loan loss reserves, and policy
work, including developing tools that help guide investments. Heron’s half-million dollar investment in TRF’s
capital base is targeted to its small-business lending program, which TRF uses to make loans to businesses located
in and hiring from low-income communities. In different
ways, Heron’s grants and program-related investments
sustain TRF by helping meet its need for capital while
also supporting Heron’s program and mission goals.
Subordinated loans to provide credit enhancement for
affordable housing development, such as the New York City
Acquisition Fund, LLC; and
Private-equity venture funds, including New Markets Venture Capital Companies, Rural Business Investment Companies, and community-development venture-capital funds.
At nearly $20 million, Heron’s program-related investment
portfolio offers a steady return, measured against a benchmark of the long-term inflation rate plus 1%, without any
losses to date.

Examples of Market-Rate Investments
Cash. The Certificate of Deposit Account Registry Service
(CDARS), a service of Promontory Interfinancial Network
that allows community banks to “pool” their $100,000 FDIC
coverage limits to attract larger deposits, allows investors to
make deposits in certain institutions, including more than a
dozen community development banks, of up to $30 million
with full FDIC insurance coverage. Heron places $5.8 million
in deposits in a number of the nation’s 60 community development banks and more than 1,000 “low-income designated”
credit unions, selecting those institutions that have a significant portion of their lending activity in asset-building activities in low-income communities.
Fixed Income (Bonds). With input from Heron, the foundation’s fixed-income manager, Community Capital Management, identifies investment-grade, fixed-income securities
issued by both public and private entities. Mission-related
bonds range from down-payment assistance for low-income,
first-time homebuyers in Texas to “blight bonds” issued by
the city of Philadelphia as part of its Neighborhood Trans-
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formation Initiative. Some of the securities in Heron’s fixedincome portfolio are backed by pools of loans originated by
community-based nonprofit organizations and aggregated
by the Community Reinvestment Fund. Community Capital
Management has also worked with the Small Business Administration to add information to loan descriptions about
borrowers’ location in low- and moderate-income census
tracts and number of employees. This information helps to
develop pools that more closely fit Heron’s mission. Heron’s
mission-related fixed-income portfolio stands at $21 million
and has outperformed its benchmark, the Lehman Brothers
Aggregate, since inception.
Public Equity. Heron uses its Community Investment Index to invest in publicly traded equities (see box on page 29).
Private Equity. Heron’s private equity is focused on real
estate, such as commercial properties in inner-city communities, and later-stage venture financing. It currently has $16
million in outstanding market-rate private equity commitments, measuring their performance against a benchmark of
the Russell 3000 plus 3%. The real estate portfolio is generating net returns ranging from the low to the upper teens, and
venture funds are producing net returns on realized investments of more than 20%.

Monitoring. Heron monitors all aspects of its portfolio,
with staff meeting quarterly and third-party monitoring reports by experts in each asset class. Monitoring efforts have
revealed a number of issues that investees face, such as leadership transitions, fundraising disappointments and market
changes that sometimes lead to deteriorating financial health.
In most cases, Heron has taken steps to stay with its investees
through tough times.

The Results: Better-than-Average Portfolio
Performance

Contrary to the perception held by many other foundation
trustees and staff that there is a trade-off between financial
return and social impact, Heron’s experience during the last
10 years demonstrates that competitive investment returns
are possible, even when incorporating mission-related investments into an overall portfolio and asset allocation. As
of December 31, 2007, Heron’s total fund performance was
in the second quartile of the Mellon All-Foundation Total
Fund Universe on both a trailing three-year and five-year basis, with 20% of assets in market-rate mission-related investments; 6% in below-market, program-related investments;
and 3% in grants.
Today’s mission-related investing environment is very difManaging the Portfolio
ferent from the one Heron encountered in 1996. Now, there
are mission-related investment vehicles in virtually every asHeron pays close attention to several factors to fulfill its fiduset class. As Vice President of Investments Luther M. Ragin,
ciary duty.
Jr., says, “That is really the story here. While each foundation
Asset Allocation. Heron’s current asset allocation, estabwill have to work at visualizlished by the board, is approxiing its own mission through
mately 65% in equities, 25% in
No longer does Heron view low-income peoan investment strategy, there
fixed-income securities, and
ple and neighborhoods merely as candidates
is no need to reinvent the
10% in alternative investments,
for grant funding. It views them as good investwheel.”
such as private equity. This alloments.
The F.B. Heron Foundacation governs all investing, both
tion has moved well beyond
traditional and mission-related.
the tipping point toward a fully diversified, mission-related
Investment Fees. With nearly one-half of its investment
investing practice. Indeed, Heron continues to expand its viportfolio in index and enhanced index investments, Heron’s
sion and investment horizons, using its broad experience in
investment management fees were 34 basis points in 2006.
working with community-based organizations to bring the
This is below the mean of other private foundations in widely
full weight of its resources, and those of other investors, to
known investment surveys.
bear on its mission. No longer does Heron view low-income
Underwriting and Due Diligence. Outside third-party
people and neighborhoods merely as candidates for grant
consultants assist both program officers reviewing belowfunding. It views them as good investments.
market, mission-related transactions and investment staff
underwriting market-rate, mission-related investments. This
“second pair of eyes” provides Heron with an independent,
arm’s-length review that supplements, but does not supplant,
staff ’s judgment.
1
	A full copy of the case study is available at www.fbheron.org/snhu_heron_casestudy.pdf.
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Public Pension Funds and Targeted Private Equity
Investment: The CalPERS California Initiative
NoÉmi Giszpenc

P

ension funds can earn attractive risk-adjusted rates
of return on targeted private equity investments in
underserved capital markets. Targeted investing is
designed to achieve both a financial and social return. This
article details the experience of the CalPERS pension fund
with targeted equity investment.
The California Public Employees’ Retirement System
(CalPERS) is the largest U.S. public pension fund.1 Since the
early 1930s, CalPERS has provided pension benefits to state,
public school, and local public agency employees, retirees,
and their families. The population of workers and retirees
served by CalPERS since the 1930s has grown over a hundred
times, from 14,000 state employees in 1933 to 1.5 million active workers and retirees in 2008. Assets under management
have expanded from $2.6 million in 1933 to approximately
$250 billion today, an increase of nearly one hundred thou-

Approximately three of every four dollars
paid in retirement benefits come from
investment earnings.
sand times. Most of the income—and source of funds for paying benefits—comes from investment rather than member
and employer contributions. Approximately three of every
four dollars paid in retirement benefits come from investment earnings.2

CalPERS Investment Policy
Given the importance of investment earnings, CalPERS
must pay close attention to its returns. CalPERS is led by a
13-member Board of Administration, which, as its investment committee, also oversees the management of CalPERS
assets. CalPERS employs a 180-member internal investment
organization plus thousands of outside managers and advisors.3 The starting point for successful returns on investment
is asset allocation—strategically diversifying among stocks,
bonds, cash and other categories of assets. This captures the
greatest return at the least overall risk to market volatility.
Many factors, including liabilities, benefit payments, operating expenses, and employer and member contributions, are
considered when determining the appropriate asset allocation mix.4
CalPERS follows a strategic asset allocation policy that de-

termines the percentage of funds to be invested in each asset
class. Policy targets are typically pursued over several years
through market declines and dollar cost averaging. The major
asset classes are global equities (targeted at 66%, including a
6% target for alternative investments, which includes private
equity and other vehicles), global fixed income (targeted at
26%), real estate (targeted at 8%), and the rest in inflationlinked assets and cash equivalents. Consistent with its guiding
principles, CalPERS manages its assets through “the highest
quality, secure and innovative programs” designed to obtain
“the highest return on our investment portfolio to survive,
prosper and grow in a safe and prudent manner.”

Alternative Investments and the California
Initiative
Unlike a private foundation, a public pension fund may not
make below-market investments. Fiduciary duty requires
public-sector
pension funds
to put finan- While keeping with
cial obligations
at the forefront of their
the principles of
decision making. However,
sound financial
these
funds
also have a
management, a
vested inter- public pension fund
est in ensuring
economically
healthy comsuch as CalPERS
munities that may target a portion in turn support employer
contributions
of its investments
to the fund.5
While keeping
within certain
with the principles of sound
geographies and
financial management,
a
underserved
public pension
fund such as
markets.
CalPERS may
target a portion
of its investments within certain geographies and underserved markets. The California Initiative is one of CalPERS’
innovative programs within the alternative investments asset
class. It seeks investment opportunities in California that offer attractive, risk-adjusted returns, commensurate with their
asset class.6
The CalPERS Alternative Investment Management (AIM)
team, directed by the investment committee, launched the
CalPERS California Initiative in 2001. The California Initiative aims to invest private equity in “traditionally underserved
markets primarily, but not exclusively, located in California,”
by finding and investing in opportunities that other sources
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What Are Underserved
Markets?
Source: Pacific Community Ventures.
(2007). CalPERS California Initiative: Impacting California’s Underserved Communities
2007. San Francisco, CA: Pacific Community
Ventures.
Underserved markets are less efficient
and have the potential to provide superior
investment performance. The three criteria
for designating a market as underserved
are: 1) companies located in areas where
access to institutional equity capital is limited, 2) companies that employ workers
who reside in economically disadvantaged
areas, and 3) companies with female or minority management.

Areas with limited access to equity

Between 2001 and 2007, about three-quarters of all California companies receiving
private equity investment were concentrated
in just 153 of the state’s 1,700+ zip codes, and
they received more than nine-tenths of all the
private equity dollars invested in the state. In
the United States as a whole, nearly one-half
of all companies receiving private equity investment are located in 774 postal codes, and
they receive four-fifths of all dollars invested
in private equity. For the purposes of the

California Initiative, companies based outside these 774 zip codes are “in areas where
access to institutional equity capital has traditionally been limited.” About one-half of
California Initiative companies (Californiabased and nationwide) were headquartered
outside the areas that traditional investment
targets.
Areas traditionally overlooked by equity
capital investment can offer some unique
advantages. In urban areas, underfunded
companies are often near centrally located
business and transportation hubs. They can
also benefit from large and diverse labor
pools and access to real estate, local consumer demand, and government incentives.
Underserved rural areas offer strategic opportunities, including inexpensively priced
land and office space, available workers,
lower living costs, government incentives,
and potential for development of technology and infrastructure.9

Economically disadvantaged areas

Economically disadvantaged areas are
low-to-moderate income (LMI) census
tracts. More than 40% of the employees
at California Initiative portfolio companies
live in areas composed predominantly of
LMI census tracts, and more than 80% of
California Initiative portfolio company em-

of investment capital may have bypassed.
The primary objective of the California Initiative is to generate attractive financial returns, meeting or exceeding private equity benchmarks.7 Early results are positive. As of September 30, 2007, the initiative reported a net 18.2% internal
rate of return since its inception.8 As an ancillary benefit, the
California Initiative seeks to have a meaningful impact on the
economic landscape of California’s underserved markets.
The California Initiative has been implemented in two
phases. Phase I was approved in May 2001 and consists of a
capital commitment of $475 million to nine private equity
funds and one fund-of-funds (see diagram on page 34). The
fund-of-funds, the Banc of America California Community
Venture Fund (BACCVF), is managed by Banc of America
Capital Access Funds (BACAF), and its investment objectives
parallel those of the California Initiative. In October 2006,
CalPERS announced a second allocation, a $500 million capital commitment to be managed by Hamilton Lane, a leading

ployees live in areas that overlap with LMI
census tracts. Although these latter employees might not reside in lower-income
communities, they live next to them and
are in a position to contribute economically to the LMI community. As a frame of
reference, 35% of all employed Americans
and 38% of all employed Californians live
in LMI census tracts.

Female or minority management

The third criterion of underserved markets is companies whose officers or key managers are women or minorities. California
Initiative companies report a total of 344
officers. Of these officers, 13% are women,
3% are Hispanic or Latino, 5% are African
American, and 6% are Asian/Pacific Islander.
Among the companies’ 1,668 reported key
managers, the distribution of women and
minorities is mostly greater or about the
same as among officers. This compares favorably with U.S. businesses with more than
$1 million in annual revenue (as is typical
of companies receiving institutional equity
capital investment). Of these, approximately
10% are owned by women, 2% are owned by
Hispanics, less than 1% is owned by African
Americans and 4% are owned by Asian/Pacific Islanders.

private equity investment manager. CalPERS and Hamilton
Lane established an investment vehicle known as the Golden
State Investment Fund (GSIF), which seeks to invest in both
partnerships and direct co-investments primarily located in
California. (The second phase allocation was later increased
to $550 million.) The Golden State Investment Fund managed
by Hamilton Lane includes as partners DFJ Frontier, Levine
Leichtman Capital, Pacific Community Ventures, and RLH
Investors.
By September 30, 2007, the California Initiative had
invested in 217 companies and GSIF had invested in nine
companies.10 This portfolio is expected to grow significantly. Among the 197 Phase I company investments, 115 were
made through the nine private equity funds while the remaining 82 were made through 13 funds in the BACCVF.
Banc of America expects its funds to ultimately invest in 150
to 175 companies.
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Chart 3: California Initiative Partners
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Ancillary Benefits
Job Creation
Companies in the California Initiative portfolio employ more
than 75,000 workers across the United States. Two companies
experienced a sharp decline in jobs (3,445 jobs lost), causing
overall job growth in the portfolio to lag national trends. Not
counting those two companies, however, the job growth nationally among companies in the first phase of the California
Initiative was 18%, and the job growth in California was 31%.
This compares with general U.S. and California employment
growth of 8% between June 2000 and June 2007.
Job Quality
California Initiative companies generally compare equally or
favorably to state and national trends in employee benefits
offered. They compare particularly well in offering medical
coverage and retirement plans, with nearly all the companies
offering medical coverage (versus about 60% nationwide) and
approximately four in five companies offering a retirement
plan (versus one-half of companies nationwide).
Supplier Relationships
California Initiative companies also support California employment by doing business with other companies in the state.
In total, Phase I companies have maintained active relationships with more than 48,000 suppliers. Approximately 10,000
of these suppliers are located in California. The four GSIF

Fund

Fund

Fund

Fund

companies that provided data for the ancillary benefits report
maintain more than 4,700 active supplier relationships, 24%
of which are with California companies. Two of the four GSIF
companies have programs in place to track minority supplier
relationships, which total 174 suppliers or 5% of their total
supplier base.

Lessons Learned
Getting Started in Targeted Investing
As is the case in foundations (see Heron MRI article, p. 27),
engaging in targeted investment at a public pension fund
usually requires a board-level champion to build support
among board members and board consultants.11 Once the
board agrees to consider a targeted investment, pension fund
internal staff typically commission an expert study of these
investment opportunities. Generally staff chooses an outside
expert with whom they are comfortable. The study can take as
long as one year to complete. During this time, both staff and
board increase their comfort levels with targeted investing.
CalPERS hired McKinsey and Co. to analyze targeted investment programs with staff. “They scoured ETI [economically
targeted investment] programs to see what worked and what
didn’t work,” reports Joncarlo Mark, Senior Portfolio Manager of the CalPERS Alternative Investment Management
Program, in a personal interview in June 2008.
The report guides the board in choosing the asset class and
level of investment most appropriate for targeted investment
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given their current asset allocation. Often staff are asked to
issue a Request for Proposal (RFP) or Request for Information (RFI) from external money managers in the chosen
asset class. Board and staff will look for proposals from top
quartile performers with a track record of successful targeted
investments. CalPERS spent significant time marketing the
program, and generated much interest from external money
managers, receiving 67 proposals. “We’re lucky,” says Mark.
“California is a pretty big market with lots of underserved
markets. You want to be diversified, and the size was meaningful.”

Best practice in targeted investment
Pension funds cannot be market makers. Private
equity is one part of the investment solution for underserved
markets. As Mark says, “The big takeaway is that institutional
private equity is just a piece of the pie.” Many opportunities
may not meet private equity return expectations. In the case
of severely blighted areas, for example, pension funds cannot
act as market makers. They can begin to invest and provide
liquidity after more appropriate government or nonprofit actors have begun making subsidized investments without expectation of return and transformed the nature of the target
area. Mark adds, “Not every company wants or needs private
equity… A lot of community development or SBA money is a
lot less expensive than what’s available in the regular market.”
It is better to use geographic rather than social
targeting. Boards should set broad geographic targets for
both internal staff and external money mangers. When investment fund
managers
receive a broad
Investments are framework for
investment
more likely to be selection, with
a
preference, successful when the for example, to
the
pension social impacts are fund’s own state
or to low- and
middle-income
not dictated.
areas, they can
select the best
investments for the fund in that geography. “They need not
pay a lot of attention to social considerations,” Tessa Hebb,
a senior research associate at the University of Oxford, explained in an interview in April 2008, “because by extension
investments in companies will have positive impacts in their
locations in terms of job creation, tax base enlargement, real
estate renewal and revitalization.” Investments are more likely
to be successful when the social impacts are not dictated. Social goals are best achieved by partnering with a local nonprofit organization whose purpose is to achieve social outcomes.

A more targeted investment program
Joncarlo Mark of the CalPERS Alternative Investment Management Program explains that starting with a broad mandate in
Phase I of the California Initiative allowed them to attract and
find good managers, whom they will continue to use. “If we
had been too heavy-handed,” he says, by limiting investments
to California, “we couldn’t have found them.” The problem,
however, is that although 70% of the companies that received
funding in the first phase are located in California, only 40% of
the invested dollars went to California.
In Phase II, one-half of the investment capital will go to California-based funds, and one-half as direct co-investments into
California companies. “This time around, we are going to make
sure we get California on a dollar basis,” says Mark. The initiative not only hopes that managers invest in the state, but it
is directly investing or driving at least one-half of the funds
to the California market, without sacrificing desired returns.
“Hamilton Lane is still using underwriting criteria in evaluating
deals and looking to generate a 20% return,” says Mark. “They
have a dedicated team of people talking to people in the community and potential investment partners, promoting what
we are doing and finding investment opportunities. They are
co-investing with any manager who has a deal in the pipeline
that meets the criteria for underserved markets and returns.
We are seeing some pretty interesting deals.”

A broad, attractive mandate can attract other
investors and leverage an institution’s investment. What the California Initiative found, reports Mark, is
that although less than half of the first phase investment of
$500 million went to California companies, the fund managers raised an additional $700 million from other investors
for a total of $1.2 billion – and when half of that pot goes to
investments in California, it is equivalent to the entire CalPERS investment having gone to California. “This is a very important consideration,” says Mark. “Foundation or program
capital is only a sliver of what is available. With a broad mandate that allows fund managers to make money, you may only
be achieving 50% targeting, but you can attract ten times as
much investment.” And, say Kruzel and colleagues in a recent
report, “Having other investors with ‘skin-in-the-game’ not
only serves to multiply the impacts of an institution’s capital,
but also helps to validate the original investment thesis.”12
Measure success in terms of risk-adjusted rates
of return. “Targeted programs have a tremendous political risk,” says Hebb. “If an investment is unsuccessful, it can
tarnish the whole program.” The mid-to-late 1980s and 1990s
saw a trend toward “economically targeted investing” directed toward social impact. Investments were meant to be market-rate, but in reality ancillary benefits took precedence, and
business plans were not as sound as they should have been. As
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a result, the targeted number of jobs did not materialize, and
the failure caused a backlash. As Kruzel and colleagues note,
“regardless of the type of mandate considered, it is paramount
that at the core of the program, performance is the primary
driver for investment. Committed capital should ONLY be
deployed to investments within the targeted mandate that can
demonstrate a return commensurate with the [investment]
risks…”13 Mark agrees, emphasizing, “First and foremost the
goal is to generate acceptable returns commensurate with the
invested asset class.”

Avoid interference in investment selection.
“One of the biggest challenges facing targeted programs is
the natural tendency for political considerations to find a way
into the investment decision process,” according to Kruzel
and colleagues.14 In selecting fund managers, boards should
choose top-quartile investment vehicles and look at track records and relationships, but they should refrain from picking
investments. Using external money managers insulates pension funds from charges of political interference in investment selection. As Kruzel and colleagues advise, “Allowing
an outside party to have a role in the decision making process
will help put in place a ‘firewall’ against political influence.”15
A fund-of-funds structure allows larger investments. Many pension funds and other institutional
investors have large sums of money to invest—much more
than most companies or even single funds can handle, particularly without running up against the pension funds’ limits
on being too large or significant an investor. A fund-of-funds
structure with an external manager allows the project to invest large sums of money, to be placed in smaller amounts in
the funds and from there into companies.
This approach, however, may lead to significant costs: generally fund managers take a commission on the profits (20%
is typical) and the manager of a fund-of-funds may take an
additional 5% to 10%. Kruzel and colleagues find that using
a fund-of-funds structure “has historically been the model
for starting a targeted program,” but that seasoned private
equity and venture capital investors may prefer using a coinvestment model.16 In fact, the second phase of the CalPERS
California Initiative, the Golden State Investment Fund, uses
a hybrid investment vehicle that is half direct co-investment
in companies and half investing in funds.
Funds-of-funds and pooled funds allow diversification and reduce risk. Fund-of-funds vehicles
can provide diversification for pension fund investors. Pension funds can also diversify targeted investment and reduce

risk by placing money in commingled, pooled funds with
reciprocal investment capability. For example, a state pension fund with $100 million in a large multistate fund could
request that the fund look for an equivalent $100 million investment in opportunities in its own state. The Golden State
Investment Fund managed by Hamilton Lane carefully constructs the direct co-investment half of the portfolio to provide diversification in terms of vintage year, strategy (such
as venture, expansion, or buyout), region, and sector, from
aerospace to bakeries. “Effectively, it gives us more control,”
says Mark.

Develop appropriate compensation to increase
buy-in. Programs must create appropriate compensation
packages for internal money managers of targeted investment
portfolios, particularly if investments are relatively small, requiring more work and generating less revenue. For example,
if a portfolio is doing well, managers might receive a bonus to
their annual salary.
Outreach and promotion can improve the investment environment. CalPERS has been an investment leader in underserved markets. Other institutions have
been slow to adopt such strategies. CalPERS was also one of
the few pension funds to target private equity in addition to
real estate or fixed income. Now significantly more institutional capital is being placed in the private equity asset class.
In addition, entrepreneurs in underserved markets have
come to more readily accept private equity. “It’s hard to give
up control to outside parties,” says Mark, “but as a result of all
the ETI programs and the kind of outreach CalPERS and its
partners have done, there is an improved acceptance among
entrepreneurs in underserved markets of accepting third party money.” Minority entrepreneurs are also seeing the advent
of new money managed by minority investors.
Sensitivity to emerging trends provides early
mover advantage in rapidly shifting markets.
As Mark says, CalPERS has demonstrated that when crafted carefully, innovative strategies can generate returns that
would please any fiduciary. He points to a second success
story: an environmental technology program that invests in
clean air, water, and energy. “Sometimes there’s good reason
that money isn’t flowing into a particular strategy,” says Mark,
“but sometimes you can be a contrarian and see a demand
and readiness among management teams and entrepreneurs,
but an absence of capital. There’s risk in investing where there
are not a lot of people competing with you, but it provides an
environment for potentially good investment returns.”
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The last word
“It feels good to meet both your fiduciary obligation and your
double bottom line.” –Joncarlo Mark
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Manufactured Home Communities – ROC USA
Paul Bradley, President, ROC USA

T

oday roughly 3.5 million homeowners live in an estimated 50,000 manufactured home communities in
the United States. Generally somebody else, usually
an investor landlord, owns the land on which their homes
sit and charges residents a monthly fee or lot rent. This relationship leads to insecurity for the homeowners; they worry
about the land being sold or the rents rising quickly. As a public policy issue, the insecurity of these communities threatens
the availability of affordable housing. Manufactured home
communities represent a sizable source of affordable housing
for low- and moderate-income people in most rural states.
As an example, roughly 4% of New Hampshire’s 1.2 million
people live in manufactured home communities.

Most of the families living in manufactured
home communities want control and the opportunity that home- and land-ownership represents.
Most of the families living in manufactured home communities want control and the opportunity that home- and

What is a Manufactured Home?
Source: reprinted with permission from Lance George and Milana Barr, Moving Home: Manufactured Housing in Rural America.
Washington, DC: Housing Assistance Council, 2005.
Manufactured Home. A manufactured home is a factorybuilt housing unit designed to meet the federal Manufactured
Home Construction and Safety Standards, also known as the
HUD Code. A manufactured home has a chassis that supports the
structural integrity of the unit and is designed to be transported
to a building site. Factory-built units that meet the HUD Code
and were constructed after the code took effect on June 15, 1976
are classified as manufactured homes.
Mobile Home. Factory-built units constructed on a chassis
and completed before June 15, 1976, are generally classified as
mobile homes.
Trailer. Trailers are technically recreational vehicles that do
not conform to local building or HUD Code standards. Although
considered antiquated and often derogatory, the term trailer is
still colloquially used when referring to manufactured or mobile
homes.
Modular Home. Modular homes are factory-built to meet
the state, local, or regional codes where the homes will be located.
Under this process, modules are assembled in three dimensions at
a factory. The modules are then towed to the building site and put
together in a variety of ways to construct the unit.

land-ownership represents. However, their wishes are not often realized owing to a lack of systematic local technical support and appropriate financing when communities are put
up for sale. Less than helpful public policies present another
barrier: most states lack a right-to-purchase statute giving

What is a Manufactured Home
Community?
Manufactured Home Community. A manufactured home
community, or “mobile home park,” is generally defined by state
jurisdiction as a single parcel of land on which sit two or more
manufactured homes. In most instances, manufactured home
communities are owned by investor landlords, and the homes are
owned by their occupants. The rental relationship between community owner and homeowners is generally a matter of state law
or local ordinance and generally is not incorporated in a lease.
Resident-owned community. Resident ownership refers
to community ownership by the homeowners. In most instances,
homeowners form a corporation (or cooperative) to acquire the
community as a whole and operate it for the benefit of the homeowners. Support for this model of ownership exists because it also
helps the broader community preserve an affordable community.
Homeowners can also achieve resident ownership through subdivision, although local zoning regulations generally have posed a
significant barrier to sub-dividing existing communities.

residents the right of first refusal when an owner wants to sell
the land, and in general the policy environment favors singlefamily residences. For a complete list of state “opportunity to
purchase” policies, see the National Consumer Law Center
website, www.nclc.org.

The New Hampshire Experience: Financing,
Technical Assistance, and Public Policy
Since 1983, the nonprofit organization New Hampshire Community Loan Fund (NHCLF) has been providing training,
technical assistance, and financing to help homeowners transform their communities into resident-owned cooperative associations. In 1984, the NHCLF made its first loan, $43,000
to 13 families in Meredith, New Hampshire. The residents
purchased their community with the funds to avoid the risk
of community closure and eviction due to change of use. In
the quarter-century since then, the Loan Fund has made $40
million in loans and leveraged another $100 million in bank
debt for resident acquisitions. The Loan Fund and bank lenders have not experienced any charge-offs or foreclosures.
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Homeowners in “for sale” manufactured home
communities need access to timely and appropriate financing, and they need access to timely and
expert technical assistance.
Homeowners in “for sale” manufactured home communities face two barriers to resident ownership. They need access
to timely and appropriate financing, and they need access to
timely and expert technical assistance for pre-purchase and
post-purchase support.

Financing
Below is a typical financing package in New Hampshire for a
60-unit park with $1.3 million in development costs (including purchase price, improvements, and other closing costs):
Bank (8.25% for 30 years) — $800,000
NHCLF (8.25% for 30 years) — $485,000
Resident Equity — $15,000 (60 x $250 per share)
Total Financing — $1,300,000
The low share price paid by individual members results in
a down payment for the cooperative’s purchase of the manufactured home community. The financial gap between what
residents can raise through the proceeds of selling membership shares and the 75% to 80% loan-to-value ratio that a
bank will provide is filled by the Loan Fund in a senior/subordinate debt package.
Private banks followed the lead taken by the New Hampshire Community Loan Fund and the New Hampshire Housing Finance Authority, a quasi-public agency, in entering this
market. Banks gained confidence that this was a legitimate
and safe line of business. These deals are a stretch for bankers
owing to ostensible challenges such as the lack of fixed leadership, no personal guarantees, little “cash” equity, likely history
of disinvestment in the property, a democratically controlled
borrower, and a new line of business for the borrower. However, since 1988, banks have reliably provided first mortgage
financing for cooperative purchases and now compete for
deals.

Training
The Loan Fund has also evolved into a specialty technical assistance provider because, in addition to capital, community
groups need customized information and training at the right
time and place to reach their goals. Many people would not
even begin to organize, believing ownership impossible. The
Loan Fund, through its Cooperative Assistance Team, helps
homeowners in New Hampshire manufactured home communities navigate the process of cooperative conversion by:

• Assisting homeowners in organizing as a cooperative
and establishing a board of directors and committees;
• Helping to arrange financing or lending funds to the
resident-owned cooperative for predevelopment work,
deposit financing, purchase and rehab; and
• Providing ongoing technical support and training.
The Loan Fund is committed to developing effective cooperative management systems and practices in every community by providing training and support to directors and members. A frontline staff of five full-time specialists in finance,
infrastructure, and organizational development provides
one-on-one and group technical assistance and training. They
also generate a statewide newsletter, run a leadership training
program, and convene a biannual conference.

Policy
In New Hampshire, a partnership between tenant activists
and community economic development practitioners has resulted in protective regulations for owners of manufactured
homes in manufactured home communities and a sense that
remaking the industry based on resident ownership is possible. In 1988, the Loan Fund joined the Mobile Homeowners
and Tenants’ Association (MOTA) to argue for an “opportunity to purchase law” for residents. The New Hampshire Legislature adopted the law that gives residents in manufactured
home communities 60 days’ notice and an opportunity to
negotiate in good faith to acquire the community when the
investor puts the property up for sale or accepts an offer to
sell it. Under the law, the investor is allowed to sell for fair
market value and in a timely manner, while the residents gain
the potential benefits of landownership through their right to
purchase. The law’s passage was a virtual endorsement for resident-ownership, an acknowledgment at the time that owning
a home on rented land was simply bad public policy.
Also, under New Hampshire law, once installed on site, a
manufactured home is defined as real estate rather than as
personal property. It is taxed, sold, and recorded as real estate.
Home loans are secured by mortgages, eliminating the repossession risk that plagues consumers in states where manufactured
homes are treated and financed as personal property. Treating
manufactured homes as real estate is also key to attracting conventional residential lenders, who can provide far more favorable financing terms than personal property lenders.
Finally, the state’s co-op statute is easy to use and ensures
long-term affordability and security. The statute is rooted in a
democratic “one member/one vote” principle. Members elect
directors and officers at prescribed annual meetings, and the

42

nities to have a home mortgage, and that mortgage is
significantly more likely to be fixed-rate.
• These homeowners see their assets appreciating because
of lower monthly fees and improved financing options
(the availability of loans increases the effective demand
for housing, and this contributes to greater appreciation
in housing values), evidenced by a 12% price per square
foot margin over homes sold in investor-owned communities.
• These homeowners are safe from community closure
and change-of-use evictions.
• These homeowners are maintaining and improving
their water, septic, and road systems because revenues
are used locally, not exported as profits.

assets of the corporation cannot be sold without a membership vote. Were the co-op to sell its park, the proceeds beyond
each member’s share and home value would be turned over to
a 501(c)3 nonprofit corporation.

The Benefits of New Hampshire’s Cooperative
Model
There are currently 88 resident-owned communities in New
Hampshire, representing approximately a 20% market share
of all manufactured communities and nearly 5,000 units.
Experience in New Hampshire has shown that when
homeowners come together to convert their manufactured
home community to resident-owned, they achieve financial
independence and economic security, and their pride in their
neighborhood and community increases. The Carsey Institute at the University of New Hampshire recently documented
the financial benefits of resident ownership, including lower
monthly site fees over time, better home price appreciation,
and faster home sales.1
• Homeowners in resident-owned communities pay, on
average, $40 less per month after five years of ownership
than homeowners in investor-owned communities.
• Residents of resident-owned communities are nearly
twice as likely as residents of investor-owned commu-

About ROC USA
The experience and expertise developed in New Hampshire
over nearly a quarter-century is being extended to the nation
through a new organization, ROC USA™, LLC. In 2004, the
Loan Fund began training other nonprofit organizations in
the United States on resident ownership, and in 2006 began
infusing ROC USA with intellectual capital and logistical
support.

Chart 4: ROC USA
Non-profit, 501(c)3
Members
NCB CI
33%
CFED
33% NHCLF
33%

ROC USA TM, LLC
501(c)3

Preferred Shareholders
(Stage 3–Year 3)

Technical Assistance
ROC USA Network

Financing
ROC USA Capital

ROC USA
Certified TA
Providers (CTAPs)

Resident
Owned
Communities
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• Building of individual assets, and
The Loan Fund and the Corporation for Enterprise Devel• Fostering of healthy, mutually supportive communities.
opment (CFED), a Washington-based nonprofit organization
Its mission of making quality resident ownership viable nafocused on market and policy-based asset-building stratetionwide involves more than just workgies, became the
founding mem- The strategy to change the manufactured home market ing with residents of investor-owned
bers of ROC will be three-pronged, covering training and technical parks. A comprehensive homeowneroriented manufactured housing sector
USA in Decem- assistance, financing, and public policy advocacy.
strategy also involves manufacturers
ber of 2007.
who produce quality homes and responsible intermediaries
NCB Capital Impact later joined as a third member. Through
who distribute homes without predatory practices which have
those members and the Ford Foundation and Fannie Mae,
historically typified the market, such as dealer kickbacks and
ROC USA has more than $8 million in seed funding.
referral fees, agreements between lenders and dealers, salesThe organization, headed by Paul Bradley and Cheryl Sesprice excesses, and so on. Home-purchase financing represions, two of the most experienced leaders in resident ownersents another
ship, launched in May 2008, and it is now
Manufactured homeowners have long been catego- crucial
step,
a free-standing, incorporated, 501(c)3
with its own staff and governance struc- rized as “subprime” because of their housing choice, not and should be
conventional
tures. Governing ROC USA is a board of because of their credit quality.
residential fidirectors, who are currently drawn from
nancing, not the subprime and other high interest loans that
the LLC members and will expand to include homeowners,
currently compose two-thirds of the market. Manufactured
nonprofit Certified Technical Assistance Providers, and other
homeowners have long been categorized as “subprime” beindustry experts.
cause of their housing choice, not because of their credit qualAs in New Hampshire, the strategy to change the manufacity. The New Hampshire Community Loan Fund, however,
tured home market will be three-pronged, covering training
has demonstrated the viability of standardized home mortand technical assistance, financing, and public policy advocagage loans to these residents and paved the way for traditional
cy. ROC USA will provide technical assistance and financing
banks to increasingly serve this market.
through two subsidiary branches: ROC USA Network and
ROC USA Capital.
The ROC USA Network will provide the training and techROC USA Capital
nical assistance that helps homeowners buy their community.
To carry out ROC USA’s national mission, a specialized fiROC USA Certified Technical Assistance Providers (CTAPs)
nancing entity must play a role. ROC USA Capital, a subsidare local and regional nonprofit organizations dedicated to
iary of ROC USA with additional outside preferred shareproviding high-quality and timely services to homeowner
holders, provides affordable loans to resident-owned entities
groups when their communities are for sale. ROC USA has
or cooperatives formed by homeowners in manufactured
certified and trained an initial group of local technical ashome communities. These groups are seeking financing to
sistance providers who will work directly with homeowners
acquire or improve the land where their homes sit. ROC USA
and communities on pre-purchase and post-purchase techniCapital’s goals are to:
cal and organizational needs. Nine CTAPs provide services
• Provide affordable manufactured home community
to manufactured home communities in 28 states (see box on
loans,
page 42).
• Provide high loan-to-value financing,
ROC USA Capital will originate high loan-to-value com• Operate sustainably,
munity purchase loans, holding subordinate pieces and sell• Manage interest rate risk,
ing senior notes to established community development and
• Maintain loan performance,
private lenders. ROC USA will use its competitive advantages
• Lend on a national basis,
of offering qualified technical assistance, high loan-to-value
• Maximize lending capacity, and
lending, deep experience, and knowledge of how to develop
• Develop multiple exit strategies over time.
the manufactured home market to achieve its goals:
• Preservation and improvement of affordable communities,
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The last three goals are closely related. To obtain the lending capacity needed to operate nationally at scale, ROC USA
Capital must sell or finance a significant portion of its loan
portfolio position. Numerous strategies exist with various
loan channels to execute the strategy.

Conclusion
ROC USA is a social enterprise focused on a specific market
segment in need of specific resources and expertise to deliver
better benefits to low-income homeowners. It enters the market after 24 years of market testing in New Hampshire, with
market position and intellectual property. It has leveraged the
investment of powerful members and supporters, capitalized
its financing facility with equity and established exit channels,
and organized nine existing nonprofit organizations as local
technical assistance providers. ROC USA represents a national scale strategy in community economic development that is
seeking to fulfill its mission of making resident ownership a
reality nationwide.

Certified Technical Assistance Providers
CASA of Oregon, Newberg, Oregon. Market Area: Oregon
Community Resources Group, Fayetteville, Arkansas. Market
Areas: Arkansas, Texas, Tennessee, Mississippi, Louisiana, Oklahoma
Crossroads Urban Center / Utah Resident Owned Communities (UROC), Salt Lake City, Utah. Market Area: Utah
New Hampshire Community Loan Fund, Concord, New
Hampshire. Market Area: New Hampshire
Northcountry Cooperative Foundation, Minneapolis, Minnesota. Market Areas: Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota,
Wisconsin, and Iowa
NeighborWorks Montana, Great Falls, Montana. Market Area:
Montana
Real Estate Advisory and Development Services, Inc.
(READS), Metuchen, New Jersey. Market Area: New Jersey
Rural Community Assistance Corporation, West Sacramento,
California. Market Areas: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado,
Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, Washington, Wyoming
Rural Opportunities, Inc. (ROI), Rochester, New York. Market
Areas: New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania

1
S. Ward, C. French, and K. Giraud. (2006) Building Value and Security
for Homeowners in “Mobile Home Parks:” A Report on Economic Outcomes (Durham, NH: Carsey Institute, University of New Hampshire),
available at http://www.rocusa.org/3B1_carsey_report_3C7A.pdf.
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